R v Asfan Ber Mirza

Applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal against conviction may be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no arguable error and are wholly without merit. A bare disagreement with the jury’s assessment of credibility or facts does not ordinarily found an appeal. A late application may be refused on its substantive merits without determining the reasons for delay. A conviction for stalking simpliciter may be returned as an alternative verdict after acquittal on stalking with fear of violence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. In an unmeritorious application that wastes court resources, the court may order payment of reasonable transcript costs under section 18(6) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

The applicant was convicted in the Crown Court at Leicester of stalking without violence, contrary to section 2 A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. He was acquitted of stalking with violence under section 4A, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and made subject to a ten-year restraining order.

He applied 171 days out of time for leave to appeal against conviction and for an extension of time. A single judge refused the applications. On renewal, the applicant challenged the treatment of telephone and cell-site evidence, witness credibility, factual findings, the alternative verdict, the limited appointment of an advocate and other aspects of the trial. The central issues were whether any ground was arguable and whether the delay should be extended.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal against conviction.

1. Arguability. The grounds disclosed no arguable error and were wholly without merit. Complaints about the credibility of the complainant and police witnesses, the family address and the evidence linking the applicant to the telephone calls concerned matters for the jury. A disagreement with the jury’s view of the evidence was not a legitimate ground of appeal. Other grounds were unintelligible or identified no possible error.
2. Alternative verdict. The acquittal on stalking with fear of violence under section 4A did not prevent a conviction for stalking simpliciter under section 2 A. That was an available alternative verdict under section 6 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
3. Representation. The advocate had been appointed under section 36 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 for the limited purpose of cross-examining the complainant and his wife. Once that task was complete, her absence at the verdict did not make the trial unfair, particularly as the applicant declined further representation.
4. Delay and costs. Since the proposed grounds lacked substantive merit, it was unnecessary to decide the reasons for the 171-day delay. Referring to R v Gray & Ors [2014] EWCA Crim 2372, the court considered this an unmeritorious application warranting use of statutory powers to discourage waste of court resources. Under section 18(6) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, the applicant was ordered to pay £151.25 for the transcript within 28 days.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The renewed applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal against conviction were dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the reasonable transcript cost.
2. Single Judge — The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was refused because the grounds were unarguable and wholly without merit.
3. Crown Court at Leicester — The applicant was convicted of stalking without violence, acquitted of stalking with violence, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and made subject to a ten-year restraining order.