R v Paul Watson

Under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020, alternative sentences may be considered when deciding whether the seriousness of offending justifies life imprisonment. That regime is distinct from section 283(3), which requires life imprisonment unless particular circumstances relating to the offending or offender would make it unjust. The sentencing judge must identify those circumstances and explain why they make life imprisonment unjust. Age alone, without adequate analysis, is insufficient. A guilty plea does not itself provide the required basis. Where no relevant particular circumstances are established, an extended sentence cannot replace the mandatory life sentence.

The offender pleaded guilty at the start of his trial to three counts of rape and one count of controlling or coercive behaviour. The Crown Court at Preston imposed an extended sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment, comprising 14 years in custody and three years on extended licence.

The Solicitor-General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, alleging that it was unduly lenient. The central issues were whether life imprisonment was required under sections 285 or 283 of the Sentencing Act 2020, and whether the offender’s age, guilty plea or the availability of public protection through an extended sentence justified withholding a life sentence.

Leave was granted and the application succeeded. The extended sentence was quashed and the offender was resentenced to life imprisonment.

1. The sentencing judge had mistakenly referred to section 273 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which applies to offenders under 21, instead of section 285. The court considered that the statutory requirements for section 285 were fulfilled. Those requirements include the offender’s age, the nature and date of the offence, and a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences.
2. Under section 285, the court may legitimately consider alternative sentences which meet the gravity of the case when deciding whether life imprisonment is justified. On the present facts, including the serious domestic sexual offending, the previous convictions and the pre-sentence report’s cogent assessment of continuing dangerousness, the judge had dismissed life imprisonment too hastily. If section 285 had been the only applicable provision, the court would nevertheless have hesitated to interfere.
3. The requirements of section 283(1) were also fulfilled because the offender had a previous Schedule 15 offence for which he had received a 10-year sentence. Section 283(3) made life imprisonment mandatory unless particular circumstances relating to the index offence, the previous offence or the offender made it unjust in all the circumstances.
4. The judge had treated section 283 as discretionary. He identified the offender’s age but did not explain why it constituted a particular circumstance making life imprisonment unjust. The court could identify no relevant circumstances from the offending, the previous offence or the offender. The guilty plea did not provide such a circumstance.

Applying section 323 of the Sentencing Act 2020, the court took the notional determinate sentence as 14 years. Two-thirds produced nine years and four months, reduced for remand in custody to a minimum term of eight years and 220 days.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On a reference by the Solicitor-General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, leave was granted. The application succeeded, the extended sentence was quashed and a life sentence was imposed.
2. Crown Court at Preston — On 14 January 2025, the offender was sentenced to an extended sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to three rapes and controlling or coercive behaviour.