R v Javed Sheikh

Findings made in civil proceedings are not automatically inadmissible in a criminal trial. A finding concerning a fact in issue may be admitted, but the jury must decide guilt independently on the criminal evidence and to the criminal standard of proof. Evidence of civil proceedings may also be relevant to chronology and motive.

A judge may refuse to exclude such evidence under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 where its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice and a clear jury direction safeguards the defendant. A course of stalking continuing after the increased statutory maximum takes the later maximum sentence.

The applicant was convicted at Bristol Crown Court of stalking contrary to section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The prosecution case was that he created, maintained and publicised an abusive and threatening blog directed at a judge and the judge’s family after unsuccessful tribunal proceedings. He denied responsibility and, alternatively, relied on freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

He renewed applications for permission to appeal conviction and an eight-year sentence after refusal by the Single Judge. The challenges concerned the admission of civil judgments and contempt proceedings, the refusal of a submission of no case to answer, jury directions, the Article 10 issue, totality, mental disorder, and the applicable maximum sentence.

1. The court dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal conviction and refused permission to appeal sentence. The conviction was not arguably unsafe, and the sentence was not arguably wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

2. The trial judge had correctly admitted evidence of the civil proceedings. Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 did not establish that all civil findings are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. R v Hogart [2007] EWCA Crim 338 was consistent with that conclusion. The civil finding about the identity of the blogger was admissible, but it was not determinative because the criminal trial proceeded on a different evidential basis and required proof beyond the criminal standard.

3. The judge had also acted properly under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The evidence was probative of identity, chronology and motive. Its possible prejudicial effect was adequately addressed by a firm direction that the jury must decide the case independently and must not treat the civil findings as decisive.

4. There was ample circumstantial evidence on which a properly directed jury could be sure that the applicant controlled the blog. Alleged omissions in the police investigation could not found a submission of no case to answer, because that application had to be determined on the evidence before the jury. The directions on the balance between freedom of expression and the complainant’s private life, and on the complainant’s status as a witness of fact, were unassailable.

5. The offending was an exceptionally serious high-culpability, greater-harm stalking case. The civil contempt sentence punished disobedience of court orders, whereas the criminal sentence punished the stalking offence. The judge had considered the overlap and was not required to give full credit for the contempt sentence. The available medical evidence did not show an impairment which reduced culpability. As the course of conduct continued after 3 April 2017, the increased ten-year maximum applied.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Renewed applications after refusal by the Single Judge. Permission to appeal conviction was dismissed and permission to appeal sentence was refused.
• Crown Court at Bristol (Saini J): The applicant was convicted of stalking on 29 January 2024 and sentenced on 30 January 2024 to eight years’ imprisonment, with a restraining order under section 359 of the Sentencing Act 2020.