R v Nah’shun Thomas

When co-offenders convicted of murder fall within different age bands in Sentencing Act 2020, Schedule 21, the statutory starting points must be respected. However, sentencing requires an assessment of each offender’s maturity, culpability and the need for fair parity. Chronological age is not conclusive.

A substantial age difference, particularly between a 16-year-old and a 19-year-old, may properly produce markedly different minimum terms. A sentencing judge may reflect immaturity and a secondary role while also taking account of joint criminality, knowledge of a weapon, associated offending and totality.

The applicant, aged 19, was convicted at Croydon Crown Court of murder following trial and pleaded guilty to two robberies committed on the same evening. His younger half-brother, aged just under 16½, delivered the fatal knife blow during a joint robbery. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years and three months, less time spent on remand.

The trial judge adopted the 30-year starting point for a murder for gain, reduced it for the applicant’s immaturity and adjusted it for the linked robberies. The applicant renewed an application for permission to appeal against sentence after refusal by a single judge. He contended that the minimum term was manifestly excessive because of disparity with his brother’s term, his immaturity and his lesser role.

Permission to appeal against sentence was refused. The proposed appeal was not arguable.

1. The sentencing judge was required to give effect to the age-based starting points in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. Murder committed for gain carried a 30-year starting point for the applicant. His 16-year-old brother fell within the different statutory starting point applicable to children.

2. Following R v Kamarra-Jarra [2024] EWCA Crim 198, age is not merely mathematical. A court must look beyond chronological age when assessing maturity and culpability, and must seek fair parity between co-offenders. The trial judge had done so by reducing the applicant’s minimum term for immaturity and by considering its comparison with his brother’s term.

3. The marked difference between the brothers’ ages and statutory starting points materially distinguished this case from one involving offenders close to the age of 18. Parliament had deliberately created a ten-year gap between the applicable starting points for a 16-year-old and a 19-year-old convicted of this category of murder. A considerably greater disparity in minimum terms could therefore be fair.

4. The judge had adequately allowed for the applicant’s immaturity and for his not having inflicted the fatal wound. He was nevertheless the older brother, intentionally assisted or encouraged the attack, knew that his brother carried a knife, acted jointly in the robbery, did not seek help after the stabbing, and participated in the related robberies. The minimum term was nearly five years below the statutory starting point despite also reflecting the robbery offending and totality.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a renewed application following refusal by a single judge, permission to appeal against sentence was refused.
• Croydon Crown Court: On 15 May 2024, the applicant was sentenced for murder to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years and three months, less 479 days spent on remand. Concurrent sentences of 30 months’ detention in a young offender institution were imposed for two robberies.