R v Kieron Mead

When sentencing multiple breaches of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, the court may assess culpability by reference to the overall pattern of offending. Repeated breaches may therefore place the offending in a higher culpability category even though an individual breach, considered alone, would not do so. The sentencing court should then select a lead offence and ensure that the total sentence reflects the offending as a whole. It must avoid double counting persistence by relying on it both for the culpability categorisation and for a further totality uplift. The resulting sentence should remain within the applicable guideline range and reflect the timing, persistence and circumstances of the breaches. An immediate custodial sentence may remain necessary where the offending demonstrates a complete disregard for court orders, even if suspension would otherwise be available.

The appellant was sentenced by the Crown Court at Bradford to an aggregate two years and six months’ imprisonment for six breaches of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. The order restricted his use of social media, messaging platforms and internet-enabled devices, and required devices to be made available for inspection. The breaches involved undisclosed devices, unauthorised messaging and social-media activity over approximately 12 months, including conduct after arrest and seizure of devices.

He appealed on the basis that the sentencing judge had wrongly treated every breach as falling within culpability category A, producing a disproportionate sentence. The central issues were whether culpability could be assessed globally, how totality should be applied to multiple breaches, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The sentence on count 6 was reduced from two years six months’ imprisonment to 17 months. The sentences of 12 months on counts 1 to 5 remained concurrent, and the ancillary orders were unchanged.
2. The court accepted that an individual breach, standing alone, would not have fallen within culpability category A. Nevertheless, it was appropriate to assess culpability by examining the overall pattern of offending. The persistent breaches, beginning shortly after the order was made and continuing after arrest and seizure of devices, placed the offending in category A. In the absence of evidence of attempts to contact children, the agreed categorisation of harm as category 3 was appropriate, without minimising the seriousness of the conduct.
3. The sentencing judge was entitled to adopt a global approach, identify a lead offence and impose concurrent sentences for the remaining offences so that the totality of the offending was reflected. However, persistence had been counted twice: first in placing the offending within the category A3 range and again in increasing the sentence to reflect totality. That made the sentence manifestly excessive.
4. Standing back, an overall sentence within the category A3 range was required. It had to reflect persistence, the prompt commencement of the breaches and their continuation after the first arrest. Allowing for mitigation and the appellant’s lack of previous custody, the appropriate sentence before credit for guilty pleas was 21 months, reduced to 17 months after the same 17 per cent credit.
5. Although suspension was technically possible at the reduced level, immediate custody was necessary. The offending showed complete disregard for court orders and required immediate punishment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against sentence was allowed only to reduce the sentence on count 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment. The concurrent sentences on counts 1 to 5 and ancillary orders remained unchanged.
• Crown Court at Bradford: The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate two years six months’ imprisonment for six breaches of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order.