Imran Budhia v R

In a sentence appeal based on disparity, the court must compare the offenders’ circumstances, including the effect of totality where one offender is already serving a sentence for part of the same offending. A proportionate sentence that is not manifestly excessive in isolation should not be reduced merely to create a differential with a co-offender. A comparator sentence may itself have been unduly lenient, and parity cannot be achieved by compounding that error. The question is whether fully informed, right-thinking members of the public would consider that something had gone wrong with the administration of justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Leeds to conspiracy to supply Class A drugs and conspiracy to transfer criminal property. On 30 October 2024 he was sentenced to 13 years 6 months’ imprisonment, with no separate penalty on the second count.

He appealed with leave, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive because a co-defendant, Mahmood, had received the same nominal sentence. Mahmood had been the head of the operation, had relevant antecedents, had offended while in custody and was already serving a substantial sentence for part of the conspiracy. The appellant relied on his lesser role and good character. The central issue was whether the apparent disparity required the appellant’s otherwise proportionate sentence to be reduced.

Disposition

The appeal was dismissed.

1. In a disparity appeal, the court must consider whether the offenders’ circumstances are truly comparable. Factors relevant to one offender may materially distinguish the cases. In particular, totality considerations arising from an existing sentence for part of the conspiracy may make the sentencing positions different.
2. The applicable inquiry was whether fully informed, right-thinking members of the public would consider that something had gone wrong with the administration of justice: R v Fawcett (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 158 at 161. The appellant therefore faced a high bar.
3. A sentence that is appropriate when viewed in isolation should not be reduced merely to achieve parity with another sentence that was unduly lenient. As explained in R v Saliuka [2014] EWCA Crim 1907 at [11], reducing an appropriate sentence for that purpose would itself conflict with the right-thinking member of the public test.
4. The appellant’s role was integral to the conspiracy and complementary to Mahmood’s role. The difference between Mahmood directing the operation from prison and the appellant operating it outside prison did not justify significantly different treatment. The appellant’s sentence was commensurate with a large-scale commercial drugs enterprise. The starting point, mitigation, good character and guilty plea had been properly taken into account.
5. Mahmood’s existing sentence, antecedents and offending in custody had been considered in applying totality. His apparent leniency did not make the appellant’s sentence wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The appeal was dismissed.

• Crown Court at Leeds: The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 30 October 2024 to 13 years 6 months’ imprisonment, with no separate penalty on the money laundering count.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The sentence appeal was heard with leave and dismissed on 1 July 2025.