R v Callum McManus

On an appeal against sentence, the question is whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. Consecutive sentences may require an adjustment for totality, but any adjustment may properly be minimal where the offences are distinct and do not materially overlap.

Where harm relied on to categorise one offence overlaps with harm separately punished in another offence, the appellate court may examine the categorisation. Any error will not justify intervention where the aggravating features independently justify the sentence imposed. The court must stand back and assess the aggregate sentence in light of the offending, relevant antecedents and aggravating features.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Chester to breach of a restraining order and assault occasioning actual bodily harm against his long-term partner. The offences were committed the day after he had been released following an earlier conviction for assaulting the same complainant and after a restraining order had prohibited contact.

On 14 March 2025, HHJ Leeming imposed consecutive sentences of six months’ imprisonment for the breach and 22 months’ imprisonment for the assault, making 28 months in total. The appellant appealed with leave of the single judge, contending that the judge double counted harm, failed to reduce the consecutive terms for totality, and failed to reflect three months spent in custody following recall.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The aggregate sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
2. The court accepted that the sentencing judge did not appear to make an adjustment for totality when imposing consecutive sentences, and that an adjustment was at least arguable. However, any reduction would have been minimal. The breach of the restraining order and the assault were distinctly different offences and, save for one point concerning harm, did not materially overlap.
3. There was some force in the submission that categorising the restraining-order breach by reference to harm caused by the later assault risked double counting. If there was little or no additional harm or distress from the breach itself, category 3B was the logical alternative. That did not make the sentence wrong. The appellant’s extensive record, the breach on the day after the order was imposed, and his history of disobeying court orders justified a sentence above that category range or sentencing the offence as category 2B.
4. The court rejected the contention that the judge had failed to take account of the three months spent in custody on recall. The judge had expressly said that he did so, and there was no basis to conclude otherwise.
5. Standing back, the breach was calculated and highly reprehensible. The assault was gratuitous, cowardly and serious, and occurred in a domestic context. Those features, together with the appellant’s record and the other aggravating factors, placed the aggregate sentence well within the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against sentence and upheld the aggregate sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Chester: on 14 March 2025, HHJ Leeming imposed consecutive sentences of six months for breach of a restraining order and 22 months for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.