Birmingham City Council v Persons Participating, or Intending to Participate in, Street Cruises & Ors

On review of a quasi-final injunction against persons unknown, the court should not start afresh. It should examine the earlier findings, determine whether anything material has changed, and reassess the scope and necessity of the order in light of the current evidence.

Continuation requires sufficient evidence, procedural and legal rigour, and a compelling justification where Convention rights are engaged. The injunction must be closely matched to the pleaded danger and should not extend to unrelated nuisance or criminal conduct. Definitions of persons unknown and methods of service should provide effective protection to affected persons. Annual review remained appropriate, although wider nationwide use might raise legislative and constitutional concerns.

The Birmingham and Wolverhampton proceedings concerned quasi-final injunctions restraining persons unknown and named defendants from organising or participating in dangerous street cruises. Earlier interim and quasi-final injunctions had been granted and continued by different judges. The review court considered updated evidence of enforcement, reduced complaints, continuing risks and displacement of activity.

The claimants sought continuation of the injunctions under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972, section 1 of the Localism Act 2011 and section 130 of the Highways Act 1986. The central questions were whether the injunctions remained justified, whether any material change required discharge or alteration, and how narrowly the prohibited conduct and defendant categories should be defined.

1. Review test. The injunctions were not reviewed de novo. The court had to assimilate the earlier findings, identify the substratum of the feared unlawful conduct, and determine whether anything material had changed. If the risks remained and procedural and legal rigour had been observed, continuation was permissible; if material matters had changed, the scope and need for the injunction had to be reconsidered.
2. Justification and Convention rights. The court found sufficient evidence on the balance of probabilities. The qualified rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not protect dangerous driving which placed the public at risk. The ordinary balance of convenience test was displaced by a requirement for compelling justification. That justification was established by the continuing danger, the effectiveness of the injunctions and the speed and deterrent effect of civil committal. Damages were inadequate because compensation could not restore lives, bodily integrity or lost capacity.
3. Scope and tailoring. The injunctions had to match the claims. The Birmingham definition of street cruising was narrowed to dangerous or excessive driving, convoy driving, racing, stunts and obstruction of highways or private property. Drug use, public urination, shouting, abuse, intimidation and fireworks were removed as unrelated to the street-cruising mischief. The geographic boundaries remained appropriate.
4. Procedural safeguards. Annual review remained necessary. Alternative methods of service were appropriate for persons unknown, particularly given the exceptional nature of an injunction operating against the world. The persons unknown had to remain narrowly defined. The court rejected the need for prior judicial permission before public authorities commenced committal proceedings, since an arrested person would promptly be brought before a High Court judge.
5. The injunctions were continued in amended form pending formal orders. Undertakings could permit certain named defendants to be removed. The court also noted, without deciding, that a nationwide network of such injunctions might raise legislative and constitutional concerns.

The judgment concerned annual review of earlier interim and quasi-final injunctions made in the same proceedings. The court continued them pending amended orders; no appellate history was stated.