R v Umal

In assessing Pages of Crown Evidence under Schedule 2 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, electronic evidence should be included only to the extent that it has material evidential value and requires proper consideration. Where the prosecution relies on extracts from a category of electronic data, the whole category may ordinarily be included, or an appropriate percentage where the material is largely irrelevant. Duplicative material, including a chronological timeline reproducing data already counted, should not attract an additional allowance. The assessment must balance adequate remuneration against inappropriate overpayment and remains fact-sensitive.

Maguires Solicitors appealed against the Legal Aid Agency’s assessment of its graduated fee claim for representing a defendant in Crown Court proceedings. The dispute concerned the appropriate count of Pages of Crown Evidence in two mobile-phone download reports. The Determining Officer allowed 4,204 pages but excluded most images, instant-messaging sections, attribution data and timelines. The appellant sought a substantially higher count, arguing that the material was relevant to the prosecution case and that inaccurate prosecution page references required additional work. The central issues were whether the excluded electronic material required inclusion under Schedule 2 and whether the timelines were duplicative.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The appropriate PPE count was increased from 4,204 to 4,943 pages. The additional payment was to include 175 pages of instant-messaging data, four pages of attribution data and 560 pages of images, together with £500 plus VAT for costs and the £100 appeal fee.
2. Under paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 2, the Determining Officer must exercise a fact-sensitive discretion. Electronic evidence that is duplicative or has no material evidential value should be excluded, while the assessment must provide adequate remuneration without inappropriate overpayment.
3. Where the prosecution relies on extracts from a particular category of electronic data, it will generally be appropriate to allow the whole relevant section, or an appropriate broad-brush percentage where the section contains substantial irrelevant material. The court applied that approach to the instant-messaging sections and allowed them in full.
4. The incorrect page references in the prosecution evidence required the appellant to check both chat and instant-messaging sections, but did not justify counting irrelevant sections or duplicated pages. The four pages of attribution data were properly included because they assisted in establishing the evidential link between the telephones and the supplied reports.
5. The timelines merely placed evidence already counted into chronological order. They added no distinct evidential material and therefore attracted no additional PPE allowance. The other proposed sections were not shown to be central to the prosecution case. The possibility of a special-preparation claim for additional work was left to the LAA.

The appeal was brought under regulation 29 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 against the Legal Aid Agency Determining Officer’s assessment of the appellant’s graduated fee claim. The High Court (Senior Court Costs Office) varied the assessment by increasing the PPE count to 4,943 pages.