Yuk Ming Cheung v Office of Intercollegiate Services & Ors

A claim founded on unsupported allegations of misconduct during earlier litigation may be struck out where the pleaded facts are demonstrably and patently hopeless, or summarily dismissed where there is no real prospect of success and no compelling reason for trial.

Declaratory relief is discretionary and ordinarily requires a real dispute concerning a legal right together with a concrete benefit or purpose. It cannot be used merely to obtain vindication for alleged treatment in earlier proceedings. Witness and advocate immunity generally bar civil claims concerning conduct forming part of giving or preparing evidence, or advocacy, including allegations of conspiracy, subject to recognised exceptions such as fabrication of evidence.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Office of Intercollegiate Services, Downing College, two barristers and a firm of solicitors. He sought declarations alleging that they had misled the court, colluded with his former counsel, breached the duty of candour and interfered with the administration of justice during earlier judicial review proceedings.

The defendants applied for strike out and summary judgment. The claimant also sought to vary an order refusing default judgment and to adjourn the hearing. The issues included the evidential basis of the allegations, declaratory relief, witness and advocate immunity, abuse of process, service on the solicitors and default judgment.

1. Strike out and summary judgment. The claimant’s allegations were unsupported by evidence and depended on inferences which the court could not realistically draw. The second witness statement had not been relied upon before the earlier court. The alleged mistake concerning the claimant’s investments had not caused the costs order claimed, and cooperation between advocates in preparing a hearing bundle was ordinary conduct. Any alleged unlawful means conspiracy was also unsupported by evidence of an intention to cause damage, and damage was not pleaded consistently. The claim was therefore demonstrably and patently hopeless and disclosed no reasonable grounds under CPR r. 3.4(2)(a). Alternatively, it had no real prospect of success under CPR r. 24.3(a), with no compelling reason for trial under r. 24.3(b). It was declared totally without merit.
2. Declaratory relief. The principles in Rolls-Royce v Unite the Union required a real and present dispute concerning a legal right and a concrete benefit or purpose. The proposed declarations would not provide a necessary foundation for regulatory complaints, an injunction or a damages claim. Seeking vindication for alleged treatment in earlier proceedings was not a legitimate use of declaratory jurisdiction.
3. Immunity. Dr Yunus was protected by witness immunity because the allegations did not establish fabrication of evidence, and immunity extends to the preparation of statements. The barrister defendants were protected by advocate immunity under El Haddad v Al Rostamani & Others. The alleged collusion with the claimant’s former lawyers did not materially distinguish that authority.
4. Abuse of process. The collateral-attack jurisdiction described in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police and Allsop v Banner Jones Ltd is exceptional. Although the proceedings repeated allegations raised in earlier procedural contexts, those allegations had not been determined there. The claim and the defendants’ applications were therefore not abusive on that ground.
5. Service and default judgment. Service of an electronically sealed copy was valid under CPR PD 51O. The claimant was not entitled to default judgment while the defendants’ strike-out and summary-judgment applications remained unresolved under CPR r. 12.3(3).
6. The claim was struck out, summary judgment was entered for the defendants, the order refusing default judgment was maintained, and the claimant’s application was declared totally without merit. Permission to amend was refused.

This was a first-instance decision on applications concerning a claim arising from earlier judicial review proceedings. The judgment records that permission to appeal in those proceedings had been refused by the Court of Appeal, but the present decision was not itself an appeal.