West Dulwich Service Station Limited on behalf of West Dulwich Action Group v The London Borough of Lambeth

A consultation challenge must be assessed by viewing the process as a whole. The court asks whether anything went clearly and radically wrong, rather than whether the process could have been improved. Voluntary consultation is subject to the common-law requirements of fairness. A statutory consultation provision requiring consultation with other affected organisations may confer a broad discretion, and failure to consult a particular group is unlawful only where the circumstances are truly compelling. A public authority must consider substantial and reasoned representations that are materially relevant to its decision. Failure to consider a detailed presentation containing new and relevant material rendered the decision unlawful. Draft statutory guidance must be considered where the authority has undertaken to do so, but it did not narrow the discretion under regulation 6 of the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996.

The claimant, representing local residents and businesses, challenged two experimental traffic management orders made by the London Borough of Lambeth to establish a low traffic neighbourhood in Dulwich. The claim was brought under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

Three grounds alleged unfair consultation, failure to consider material matters and irrationality, inadequate reasons, breach of regulation 6 of the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, and unlawful fettering of discretion. The central issues were whether the consultation process was legally unfair, whether the Council had properly considered the claimant’s representations and the Department for Transport’s draft guidance, and whether the reasons for making the orders were adequate.

1. Ground 1 allowed; Grounds 2 and 3 dismissed. The claim was allowed because the Council failed to have regard to a 53-page presentation submitted by the claimant. The presentation contained detailed and up-to-date material, including survey results, accident data and evidence concerning another low traffic neighbourhood. It was highly relevant to the decision whether to make the orders and should have been considered. Its absence from the delegated report created serious doubt that it had informed the decision. The failure was a serious Wednesbury error.
2. Voluntary and statutory consultation must satisfy the common-law requirements of fairness. The process must be assessed as a whole. Defects in individual stages may be remedied by later stages. The relevant threshold is whether something went clearly and radically wrong, not whether the consultation was ideal. The defects identified, including incomplete delivery of consultation material and selective reporting of a consultation event, did not meet that threshold.
3. Regulation 6, including category 7(c), conferred a broad discretion over whether to consult additional organisations representing affected persons. The Council was not legally required to consult the claimant or the residents’ association. The claimant’s extensive prior engagement and detailed presentation provided a rational basis for concluding that further statutory consultation was unnecessary.
4. Under section 18(2) of the Traffic Management Act 2004, the Council had to have regard to the Department for Transport’s guidance. Its draft status was immaterial after the Council expressly undertook to reconsider the decision in light of it. The Council did have adequate regard to the guidance, and the guidance did not narrow the discretion under regulation 6.
5. Regulation 7 of the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014 required written reasons because the delegated decision affected individual rights. The reasons were nevertheless legally adequate. The report’s treatment of the guidance, read with its account of the consultation and engagement, enabled the reader to understand the decision and its treatment of the principal controversial issues.
6. The interim relief application had been superseded by the substantive hearing. Further submissions were directed on relief.

Not an appeal. The judgment records no earlier judicial decision in the same dispute.