Farrukh Najeeb Husain v Solicitors Regulation Authority

Key principles and disposition: The court dismissed the appeal under s.49 of the Solicitors Act 1974, applying the CPR 52.21(3) test and the authorities requiring caution and deference to findings and sanctions of a specialist disciplinary tribunal. The court held that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) was entitled to exclude the late psychiatric report from the issue of liability for proper case management reasons while admitting it for reasonable adjustments and mitigation; there was no evidential basis that the appellant's depression negated culpability. The SDT correctly identified and applied the applicable Article 10 principles, and its findings that many tweets were objectively antisemitic and/or seriously offensive were open to it. The court accepted that the IHRA working definition and examples may be a persuasive tool but are not determinative; application requires careful contextual analysis. The SDT's conclusion that striking off was the appropriate sanction was within the ambit of its discretion and not clearly inappropriate.

Background and procedural posture: Farrukh Husain, a solicitor admitted in 2014, was investigated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority following complaints about tweets and later offensive correspondence. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal heard the case over multiple days in 2023–2024, found the allegations proven in a judgment of 28 March 2024 and ordered that Mr Husain be struck off. He appealed under s.49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 to the Administrative Court.

Nature of the appeal (relief sought): Mr Husain sought to set aside the Tribunal's findings and sanction. He advanced grounds alleging (1) that psychiatric/medical evidence established a disability and that the SDT erred in excluding that evidence for liability and failing to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010; (2) that the tweets were political speech attracting the highest protection under Articles 9 and 10 ECHR and the SDT applied the wrong test; (3) that the SDT erred in its use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism and in admitting and relying on expert evidence from a Campaign Against Antisemitism witness; and (4) that striking off was manifestly excessive.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the Tribunal's case management decision to limit the psychiatric evidence to adjustments and mitigation and to exclude it from the liability issue was impermissible or made the final decision unjust.
• Whether the Tribunal applied the correct legal approach to Article 10 protection for political speech.
• Whether reliance on the IHRA working definition and the weight given to the SRA's expert evidence was legally flawed.
• Whether the sanction of striking off was disproportionate or outside the bounds of reasonable tribunal discretion.

Court's reasoning and conclusions:

• On medical evidence and disability: the court concluded the late psychiatric evidence did not show that depression negated the appellant's culpability for the tweets; exclusion from liability was a legitimate case management decision and the SDT had taken reasonable steps to make adjustments during the hearing. It was not necessary to determine whether the appellant was a "disabled person" for Equality Act purposes and the duties under s.29 do not apply to judicial functions (Schedule 3, para. 3).
• On Article 10: the court confirmed that political speech benefits from heightened protection but held that the SDT did, in substance, apply a suitably high threshold (looking for seriously offensive or seriously discreditable conduct) and that the tribunal's reasoned findings on seriousness were adequate.
• On IHRA and expert evidence: the court explained that the IHRA working definition and examples are persuasive illustrations but not automatic determinatives; particular caution is required when examples concern criticism of Israel and its policies. The SDT was entitled to call and rely on expert evidence to explain historical tropes and cultural manifestations of antisemitism; the court advised circumspection in the weight given to an expert who was active in a polarised field but concluded the SDT's reliance was limited and its factual findings were open to it.
• On sanction: having regard to the SDT's factual findings about repeated, sustained and racially/motivated conduct, lack of insight and the risk of repetition, the court held that striking off was not clearly inappropriate and therefore would not be overturned on appeal.

Wider context: the court remarked on the sensitivity of adjudicating disputes that implicate criticism of Israel and antisemitism, urged counsel to focus on narrow legal issues in future and reiterated that use of the IHRA examples must not chill legitimate political debate.

The appeal is dismissed. The court held that (i) the Tribunal was entitled to exclude the late psychiatric report from the liability issue and to admit it only for reasonable adjustments and mitigation; there was no evidential basis that the appellant's depression negated culpability; (ii) the Tribunal applied an appropriate Article 10 approach and its findings that the tweets were objectively antisemitic and/or seriously offensive were open to it; (iii) the IHRA working definition and examples are a useful but non-determinative tool and must be applied contextually; expert evidence was permissible though its weight required circumspection; and (iv) the sanction of striking off was within the Tribunal's discretion and not clearly inappropriate.

Appeal to the High Court under s.49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 from the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (final decision dated 28 March 2024). The Administrative Court (Chamberlain J) heard the appeal and delivered judgment on 14 May 2025 ([2025] EWHC 1170 (Admin)).