Law Society v Salsbury

On an appeal concerning professional discipline, the court must give considerable respect to the informed decision of the specialist tribunal. It may nevertheless intervene if, after doing so, the sanction is clearly inappropriate. The tribunal must also take account of the solicitor’s rights under the Convention.

Serious dishonesty by a solicitor will normally require striking off. The principal purpose is to maintain public confidence in the profession’s integrity, rather than to impose a further criminal punishment. Personal mitigation remains relevant but carries limited weight. A solicitor’s belief that money was due does not make the deliberate alteration of a signed cheque a low-level act of dishonesty.

The respondent solicitor altered a cheque, originally made out for £862.50, to £1,862.50. He was convicted of obtaining a money transfer by deception. The sentencing judge accepted that he believed the additional £1,000 was due to him, but described the conduct as an offence no solicitor should contemplate.

The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ordered that he be struck off. On appeal under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974, the Divisional Court set aside that order and imposed a three-year suspension, holding that the conduct fell within a small residual category of dishonesty where striking off was disproportionate: [2008] EWHC 889 (Admin).

The Law Society appealed. The central issues were the proper appellate approach to a disciplinary sanction and whether these facts justified departure from the normal sanction for serious solicitor dishonesty.

1. Appeal allowed. The court reinstated the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s order striking the solicitor off the Roll.

2. The principles in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1WLR 512 remained applicable. They had to be applied consistently with the solicitor’s rights under articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. It was no longer correct to require a “very strong case” before appellate intervention. The Tribunal was nonetheless an expert and informed body whose assessment of the measures needed to protect the public deserved considerable respect. The High Court could interfere only if, after giving that respect, it was satisfied that the sanction was clearly inappropriate. An appeal from the Tribunal would normally proceed by review under CPR rule 52.11(1).

3. Serious dishonesty by a solicitor normally attracts striking off. The purpose is primarily to preserve the profession’s collective reputation for integrity and to sustain public confidence, rather than to punish the solicitor again for conduct already dealt with criminally. Personal consequences and mitigation are relevant but do not displace that essential public-interest consideration.

4. The Divisional Court erred in treating the conduct as at the very bottom of the scale of dishonesty. The solicitor had deliberately altered both words and figures on a signed cheque to obtain payment without informing the trustees or seeking their authority. His belief that he was owed the additional sum did not make the conduct venial. It was a gross breach of professional conduct which undermined confidence in solicitors’ handling of client money.

5. The Tribunal had considered the individual circumstances and was entitled to conclude that striking off was appropriate and proportionate. Even if the matter were borderline, the Divisional Court was not entitled to substitute its own assessment because the Tribunal’s decision was not clearly inappropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Law Society’s appeal and reinstated the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s order striking the solicitor off.
• High Court, Divisional Court: In [2008] EWHC 889 (Admin), allowed the solicitor’s appeal, set aside striking off and substituted a three-year suspension.
• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: Ordered that the solicitor be struck off the Roll following his conviction for an offence involving dishonesty.