London Borough of Enfield v Anthony Beckford

An abatement notice for statutory noise nuisance is not invalid merely because it leaves the recipient to choose the means of abatement. A requirement to abate under section 80(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 must be distinguished from a requirement under section 80(1)(b) specifying works or steps. Only in the latter case must the required steps be stated clearly. Notices are construed objectively, fairly and in a common-sense manner. Unnecessary wording may be deleted under regulation 2(5) of the Statutory Nuisance (Appeals) Regulations 1995 without invalidating the notice. A local authority acting properly in discharge of its statutory duty is not subject to the usual presumption that costs follow the event.

The London Borough of Enfield appealed by way of case stated against a District Judge’s decision at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court to quash an abatement notice concerning noisy music from the respondent’s home. The Judge accepted that a statutory nuisance existed but held that the notice was invalid because it did not specify the steps required to abate the nuisance, or alternatively because its requirements were unreasonable. She also ordered the local authority to recover half its costs.

The High Court had to determine whether the notice was a steps notice, whether its wording was unreasonable, whether it could be varied by deleting surplusage, and whether the costs order was correct.

1. Appeal allowed in substance. The appeal was one by way of case stated under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. The High Court was confined to questions of law and jurisdiction and had to treat the facts as stated in the Case.

2. The notice was an abatement notice under section 80(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, not a notice requiring specified works or steps under section 80(1)(b). Its essential requirement was to abate the noisy music nuisance. The recipient was entitled to choose the means of achieving that result. If an authority elects to require works or steps, those requirements must be stated clearly for reasons of fairness and enforceability.

3. The notice had to be construed objectively, fairly and in a common-sense way. In context, requiring the respondent to exercise proper control of the volume merely repeated the abatement requirement. The words did not impose a separate steps requirement. The phrase referring to noise being “not likely to cause a nuisance” was unhelpful surplusage, but did not make the substantive requirement unreasonable.

4. Under regulation 2(5) of the Statutory Nuisance (Appeals) Regulations 1995, the court could delete unnecessary wording and confirm the notice as valid. The distinction was between unnecessary words and requirements that were themselves unreasonable or unnecessary under regulation 2(2)(c). The second part of the notice, beginning with the words requiring the respondent to exercise proper control, should be deleted for clarity, while the core abatement requirement remained valid.

5. The respondent’s appeal below should therefore have been dismissed. The costs order had no proper basis. Applying section 64(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, where a regulatory authority acts honestly, reasonably, properly and in the exercise of its public duty, the starting point is ordinarily no order for costs rather than costs following the event.

6. The Judge’s decision was quashed. The case was remitted to Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court with a direction to dismiss both the respondent’s appeal and the costs order. There was no order as to costs below; any application for costs of the High Court appeal was to be dealt with on the papers.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — allowed the appeal by case stated, quashed the District Judge’s decision, and remitted the case to Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court with directions to dismiss the respondent’s appeal and costs order.
• Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court — quashed the abatement notice on the basis that it failed to specify required steps or, alternatively, that its requirements were unreasonable, and ordered the local authority to recover half its costs.