Dr Rinku Sengupta v The General Medical Council

A tribunal exercising the power to suspend indefinitely a practitioner’s right to make further restoration applications must identify the specific reasons why that power is justified. Relevant considerations may include the merits and conduct of previous applications, the reasons for erasure, subsequent events, the passage of time and the realistic prospects of a successful future application. The overarching objective in [1983 Act] remains relevant, but its unparticularised recitation cannot substitute for analysis of the purpose of the suspension power. A decision containing a material failure to explain relied-on inconsistencies is seriously irregular and may be quashed without remittal where delay would make a further reconsideration inappropriate.

The claimant’s name had been erased from the medical register following findings of dishonesty and deficient professional performance. Three applications for restoration were refused. After the third refusal, the Medical Practitioners Tribunal indefinitely suspended her right to make further applications under section 41(9) of the Medical Act 1983.

Linden J quashed an earlier suspension decision and remitted the issue to a differently constituted Tribunal: [2023] EWHC 1302 (Admin). On the remitted hearing, the Tribunal again made a suspension order. The claimant appealed under section 40 of the 1983 Act. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had properly reasoned its decision and whether the matter should be remitted.

1. Appeal allowed. The Tribunal’s suspension decision was quashed. The Tribunal’s conclusion on deficient clinical performance could not be faulted. The distinction between clinical and surgical performance made no difference on the facts, since both referred to the ability to apply theoretical knowledge in a clinical setting.
2. Section 41(9) of the Medical Act 1983 does not prescribe an exhaustive list of relevant considerations. The Tribunal should nevertheless consider whether there is sufficient reason to prevent further restoration applications without prior permission under section 41(11). Relevant matters may include whether previous applications were without merit from the outset, the practitioner’s conduct in pursuing them, the reasons for erasure, events since erasure, the passage of time and the realistic prospect of a successful future application. The weight of each matter is fact-sensitive.
3. The overarching objective in section 1 of the 1983 Act is always relevant to the exercise of statutory powers, but a bare or unparticularised reference to it cannot replace careful consideration of why the section 41(9) power exists.
4. The Tribunal materially relied on alleged inconsistencies between the claimant’s written and oral submissions to infer continuing lack of insight and an ongoing risk of dishonesty. It failed to identify those inconsistencies. That failure meant that the decision was not properly reasoned and amounted to a serious irregularity under CPR 51.21(3).
5. The issue was not remitted. The delay since the restoration decision had already complicated the suspension exercise, and a further remittal would intensify that problem. No further action was required. If a future restoration application were made and refused, the Tribunal could then consider whether to suspend the right to make further applications. The judgment did not criticise the earlier restoration decision, which was regarded as properly made and correct.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the remitted suspension decision was allowed. The suspension order was quashed and the matter was not remitted.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Linden J previously dismissed the challenge to the restoration decision but allowed the appeal against the earlier suspension decision, quashing it and remitting the issue to a differently constituted Tribunal: [2023] EWHC 1302 (Admin).