Dr Andrew Thilliainayagam v General Medical Council

The court granted an extension of time for the appellant to lodge his statutory appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 against a Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service determination. The extension was granted because this was an exceptional case: the appellant had personally done all he could to bring the appeal in time but his solicitors filed the appellant's notice in the King's Bench Division in error and the document was rejected by court staff. The court applied the established test derived from Pomiechowski and Adesina that time may be extended in exceptional circumstances where refusal would impair the essence of the right of access to the court under Article 6 ECHR.

The court held that the appeal could only validly be filed in the Administrative Court, that court staff were entitled to reject documents filed in the wrong office rather than transfer them, and that CPR 3.10 was not appropriate to remedy the procedural history because the appellant had now re-filed in the correct court. The extension was granted to 28 April 2025, the date on which the appellant's notice was refiled in the Administrative Court.

Background and parties: The appellant is a consultant gastroenterologist who sought to appeal a Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) determination of 24 March 2025 which found allegations of misconduct proved, found impairment of fitness to practise and imposed a one month suspension. The respondent is the General Medical Council. The appellant applied to the High Court for an extension of time to lodge his statutory appeal.

Nature of the application:

• Application for an extension of time to lodge a statutory appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983; alternatively the appellant submitted that his appellant's notice had been validly filed in the King's Bench Division on 17 April 2025 or that the procedural error could be remedied under CPR 3.10.

Relevant procedural history:

• The MPTS decision was sent on 24 March 2025 and deemed served on 28 March 2025, so the 28-day appeal period expired on 25 April 2025.
• The appellant’s solicitors filed the appellant's notice in the King's Bench Division on 17 April 2025; the filing was rejected as being in the wrong court and was not brought to the attention of the responsible paralegal until 28 April 2025, when the appellant's notice was refiled in the Administrative Court.
• The Administrative Court did not formally issue the appeal until 6 May 2025 because of volume of work; Foxton J made an order on 9 May adjourning the extension application to an oral hearing which took place before Mrs Justice Lang on 16 May 2025.

Issues for determination:

• Whether the appellant’s filing in the King’s Bench Division on 17 April 2025 was a valid filing for the purposes of section 40.
• Whether a procedural correction or transfer or reliance on CPR 3.10 could cure the initial filing error.
• Whether an extension of time should be granted as an exceptional case consistent with Article 6(1) ECHR and the line of authorities including Pomiechowski and Adesina.

Court’s reasoning and conclusions:

• The court concluded that the statutory requirement was to file the appeal in the relevant court (the High Court) and that in practice appeals under section 40 are allocated to and must be filed in the Administrative Court; filing in the King’s Bench Division office was therefore not a valid filing for these purposes.
• The Administrative Court’s practice is to reject filings in the wrong office and there is no facility on CE file for court staff to transfer between courts; on that basis the court would not treat the earlier filing as properly made in the Administrative Court nor would it direct that staff should have accepted and transferred it.
CPR 3.10 was not an appropriate remedy because the appeal has now been correctly filed; what was required was an extension of time.
• The court applied the exceptional-circumstances test derived from Pomiechowski and Adesina: the appellant had personally done all he could to bring the appeal in time; the delay was the fault of his solicitors; strict application of the statutory time limit would impair the appellant’s access to the court under Article 6(1) in the particular facts; consequently an extension of time was warranted and granted to 28 April 2025 (the date of re-filing).

Wider context: The judgment emphasises that the discretion to extend time for a statutory appeal arises only in exceptional circumstances and that the surrogacy principle (holding a litigant to the acts of their legal advisers) may yield where its application would produce injustice by impairing the essence of the right of appeal.

The application for an extension of time was allowed. The judge held that (i) the appeal could validly only be filed in the Administrative Court and the filing in the King's Bench Division was not effective; (ii) court staff are entitled to reject such filings rather than transfer them and CPR 3.10 was not an appropriate remedy because the appeal had been refiled in the correct court; and (iii) on the authorities (Pomiechowski, Adesina and related case law) this was an exceptional case in which refusal to extend time would have unjustly impaired access to the court under Article 6 ECHR, so an extension was granted to 28 April 2025.

MPTS panel determination sent 24 March 2025 (allegations proved; misconduct; fitness to practise impaired; one month suspension). Appellant's notice filed in the King's Bench Division on 17 April 2025 and rejected as lodged in the wrong court. Appellant's notice refiled in the Administrative Court on 28 April 2025; appeal formally issued and sealed on 6 May 2025. Foxton J ordered urgent listing on 9 May 2025. Oral hearing before Mrs Justice Lang on 16 May 2025 where the extension of time application was granted. [2025] EWHC 1253 (Admin) is the present judgment.