Dr Andrew Thilliainayagam v General Medical Council

A statutory appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 must be filed in the Administrative Court. Filing in another division of the High Court does not constitute valid filing where the appeal has been rejected and there is no facility for transfer. The 28-day statutory period is not itself incompatible with Article 6 ECHR, but the court must be able to extend time in exceptional cases where strict application would impair the very essence of the right of access to an appeal. The discretion is exercised only to the minimum extent necessary for Convention compliance. An appellant’s personal diligence is relevant, but is not an independent jurisdictional condition. The relevant date is filing, rather than sealing or issuing by the court.

The appellant sought an extension of time to appeal against a Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service determination finding misconduct, impaired fitness to practise and imposing a one-month suspension.

The appeal was filed within the 28-day period in the King's Bench Division, rather than the Administrative Court, and was rejected. It was refiled in the Administrative Court three days out of time. The central issues were whether the original filing was valid, whether the procedural error could be remedied under CPR 3.10, and whether time should be extended compatibly with Article 6 ECHR.

1. Proper court. Section 40(4A) of the Medical Act 1983 requires filing in the relevant court, namely the High Court. Although the King's Bench Division is a division of the High Court, statutory appeals under section 40 are allocated to the Administrative Court, which operates separately with its own office and listings. The appeal was therefore not validly filed in the King's Bench Division.
2. The appeal could not be treated as having been filed in the correct court and transferred. Court staff had no facility to transfer CE-file cases between the two courts. CPR 3.10 was not appropriate because the original filing had been rejected and the appeal had subsequently been filed in the correct court.
3. Extension of time. The 28-day limit itself did not impair the essence of the right of access to the court. However, the absence of a discretionary power to extend time in exceptional cases could do so and had to be read compatibly with Article 6 ECHR. The governing question was whether refusal would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. Any extension had to be limited to what was necessary for Convention compliance.
4. This was an exceptional case. The appellant had personally done all he could to appeal in time; the error was entirely his solicitors’ fault; the appeal was refiled immediately after the rejection was discovered; and the three-day delay had serious consequences, including suspension and loss of employment. Applying Pomiechowski, Adesina and Stuewe, the surrogacy principle could not justly prevent access to the appeal.
5. The relevant date was 28 April 2025, when the appeal was filed in the Administrative Court, not 6 May 2025, when it was sealed and issued. An extension was granted to 28 April 2025.

• Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service: On 24 March 2025, the allegations were found proved, misconduct and impaired fitness to practise were established, and a one-month suspension was imposed.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appellant’s application for an extension of time was granted to 28 April 2025.