Grzegorz Janusz Pabian, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court

Under section 36 of the Extradition Act 2003, the period for extradition runs from the date on which the relevant court decision becomes final. It does not run from the later sealing or receipt of the court order.

A court considering discharge for delay has a broad discretion to determine whether reasonable cause has been shown. Administrative error, including an element of negligence, may amount to reasonable cause. Relevant considerations include the history and reasons for the delay, its length, and the guidance in the authorities. A short delay may properly support refusal of discharge.

The claimant was ordered to be extradited to Poland. The High Court dismissed his appeal on 25 September 2024, making 18 October 2024 the deadline for removal under section 36 of the Extradition Act 2003.

The National Crime Agency did not remove him by that date, and no extension was sought before the deadline expired. The claimant applied under section 36(8) for discharge. District Judge Leong refused the application, finding reasonable cause for the 11-day delay because the NCA had relied on the date of a sealed order and had misunderstood when time began to run.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the decision was irrational and that the statutory time limit was strict and mandatory. The central issue was whether the district judge’s decision was so unreasonable that no district judge could have reached it.

1. Application dismissed. The decision of District Judge Leong refusing discharge under section 36(8) of the Extradition Act 2003 was upheld.
2. Time under section 36 runs from the date on which the relevant court decision becomes final. The date on which an order is sealed, or the date on which it is received by the enforcement authority, is immaterial. The NCA’s contrary understanding caused the missed deadline.
3. The district judge had properly considered the relevant matters: the erroneous order issued by the court, the length of the delay, the administrative error and element of negligence, and the guidance in the authorities. Her conclusion that reasonable cause had been shown was rational. The 11-day delay was a relevant consideration and could support that conclusion.
4. There was no material distinction between an error occurring before expiry of the removal deadline and one occurring afterwards. The error here arose from events and perceptions existing before expiry, including the practice of awaiting a sealed order and the failure to act on the CPS warning.
5. As a matter of law, an extension under section 36(3)(b) must be sought by the authority which issued the Part 1 warrant. In an appeal case, that is the successful respondent represented by the CPS. The court noted the practical acceptance of requests from the NCA under delegated administrative arrangements, but that practice had not been followed before the deadline.
6. The claimant’s medical condition and the later delay caused by his own judicial review challenge were not relevant to the district judge’s assessment of the 11-day delay. Removal was directed within ten days from 1 May 2025, rather than from the later sealing of the order.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Judicial review dismissed. The district judge’s refusal to discharge the claimant was upheld.
• High Court: Chamberlain J dismissed the claimant’s extradition appeal on 25 September 2024.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Callaway ordered extradition to Poland on 5 July 2023.