A Local Authority v LB & Ors

A local authority should not treat secure accommodation under Children Act 1989, section 25, and deprivation-of-liberty authorisation under the inherent jurisdiction as interchangeable options. Where section 25 may apply, the authority must consider that statutory framework and explain any decision not to use it.

Leave under section 100 requires focused evidence showing that the child is likely to suffer significant harm without the order. General concerns about parental care or exposure to risk are insufficient.

Parental responsibility does not itself authorise a deprivation of liberty. Article 5(1)(d) permits detention for educational supervision only where education in the broad sense is a central purpose, supported by appropriate resources, and the restrictions are necessary and proportionate. Welfare or prevention of absconding alone is insufficient.

The local authority sought renewed authorisation to continue restricting the liberty of LB, a 15-year-old child subject to a care order. An earlier order had permitted restrictions intended, in substance, to prevent her absconding from a placement and returning to her mother.

The court considered whether the local authority had properly explored secure accommodation under section 25 of the Children Act 1989, satisfied the leave requirements in section 100(4), and established that the proposed detention fell within Article 5(1) of the Convention, particularly educational supervision under Article 5(1)(d).

1. No renewed DOLS order was made. The application was adjourned to enable the local authority to provide further evidence, with a resumed hearing fixed for 28 May 2025.
2. Section 25 secure accommodation and inherent-jurisdiction deprivation-of-liberty orders are not alternatives available to a local authority at its option. Consistently with Re T (A Child), where section 25 accommodation may be appropriate, it should be used where available. An authority seeking to rely on the inherent jurisdiction must explain clearly why the statutory framework, including its safeguards for the child, has not been used.
3. For section 100(4), the evidence must enable the court confidently to conclude that the child is likely to suffer significant harm without the order. Generalised concerns about the parents or risks arising from a return home do not satisfy that test. The evidence must address the likelihood, nature and significance of the anticipated harm.
4. Parental responsibility arising from a care order does not itself authorise restrictions amounting to a deprivation of liberty. The authority must establish both an applicable Article 5(1) ground and proportionality.
5. Educational supervision under Article 5(1)(d) is wider than classroom education and may include the development of life skills and other aspects of upbringing. It cannot, however, be equated wholly with welfare or used primarily to prevent absconding. The authority must show that education is a central purpose, that suitable resources and appropriately trained staff are provided, and that the deprivation is necessary and proportionate to delivering that education.
6. The evidence concerning LB’s life-skills support was insufficient. The local authority was therefore given an opportunity to address the statutory and Convention tests at the resumed hearing.

The judgment describes earlier orders made in the same proceedings:

• High Court, 13 February 2025: an order permitted restrictions amounting to a deprivation of liberty, expiring on 13 May 2025.
• High Court Family Division, 25 May 2025: the renewed order was declined and the application was adjourned for further evidence.