Nobel Oil E&P North Sea Ltd, R (on the application of) v Oil Gas Authority

Under CPR 54.10, “proceedings” in judicial review may include an administrative decision-making process and its interlocking stages. The court may stay future steps, including steps affecting interested parties, where doing so protects the integrity and effectiveness of the review. A later statutory challenge does not necessarily exclude interim relief directed at earlier stages that may infect the eventual decision.

Where relief substantially operates as an injunction against an interested party, the court should consider the substance rather than the form and ordinarily require a cross-undertaking in damages. The possibility that the affected party contributed to its losses is relevant but normally carries limited weight at the interim stage.

Nobel Oil challenged decisions and advice concerning the proposed cessation of production and decommissioning of Total’s Gryphon floating production, storage and offloading vessel. Permission had been granted for the first judicial review concerning the Petroleum Act 1998 section 29(2A) decision. A second challenge concerning section 32(7) advice was to be considered at a rolled-up hearing.

Nobel sought a stay preventing the Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning from approving Total’s decommissioning programme under section 32. The issues were whether the court had jurisdiction to grant such a stay and, if so, whether it should do so without a cross-undertaking in damages.

1. Jurisdiction. The application was within the court’s jurisdiction under CPR 54.10. “Proceedings” has a wide meaning in judicial review and may include decisions by administrative bodies and the process leading to them. The statutory scheme under the Petroleum Act 1998, involving interlocking decisions under sections 29, 32(7) and 32, fell within that meaning.
2. The power could be exercised in relation to future stages of the process and could affect interested parties. The purpose was to preserve the status quo and protect the effectiveness of judicial review. The existence of a possible later challenge under section 42 did not, in principle, preclude interim relief directed at earlier stages which might infect the eventual decision.
3. The distinction between a stay and an injunction was too technical. The court had to examine the substance of the relief and apply the principles applicable to an interlocutory injunction where the practical effect was to restrain a third party.
4. Cross-undertaking. The usual expectation was that an applicant would give a cross-undertaking in damages where an interested party would be affected. The alleged self-inflicted character of Total’s losses was relevant to the balance of convenience but was of very limited weight. The evidence did not permit a concluded view on responsibility for the losses or on whether cessation of production had infringed the statutory framework.
5. The application was therefore dismissed. Nobel had stated that it would not pursue the stay if a cross-undertaking were required, and it declined to provide one.

First-instance judicial review application. The judgment records that permission had been granted in the first judicial review, while permission for the second judicial review was to be considered at a rolled-up hearing. The present application for a stay was dismissed.