Century Property (Leeds) Limited v Eville & Jones (Group) Limited & Ors

The High Court may compel a judgment debtor to exercise pension rights where doing so is just and convenient for enforcing the judgment debt. The jurisdiction extends to requiring the debtor to delegate the relevant election to the creditor’s solicitor. It is not confined to cases involving fraud.

Tax consequences usually carry little weight unless they would leave no real benefit to the creditor. A default mechanism may be included in anticipation of non-compliance where the debtor’s conduct shows that further delay is likely. An unsubstantiated challenge to the underlying settlement and judgment does not prevent enforcement.

Century Property sought substitution as claimant after the original claimants assigned the judgment debt to it. It also sought mandatory injunctions requiring Dr Aldiss to exercise rights under his self-invested personal pension when he reached age 55, so that the proceeds could satisfy the judgment debt and charging order.

Dr Aldiss opposed the applications, relying principally on an alleged lack of mental capacity when the settlement and Tomlin order were made. He served no evidence supporting that contention and sought a further adjournment and stay. The central issues were whether substitution was appropriate, whether the pension rights could be compelled under the statutory injunction jurisdiction, whether enforcement was just and convenient, and whether a solicitor should be authorised to execute documents in default.

1. Substitution. The deed of assignment validly transferred the judgment debt to Century Property. The requirements of s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 were met: the assignment was absolute, written, signed by the assignors and notified to the debtor. Substitution was therefore desirable under CPR 19.2(4), and would also have been granted under CPR 19.4(11) ([18]-[21]).
2. Injunction jurisdiction. Under s. 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court may grant an injunction wherever it is just and convenient. The demands of justice are the overriding consideration. The jurisdiction permits enforcement against pension rights by requiring the debtor to elect to draw benefits and, if necessary, to delegate that power to the creditor’s solicitor ([23]-[32]).
3. Just and convenient. The proposed order substantially reflected the parties’ compromise, there were sufficient pension funds, no other creditors or assets were evidenced, and the application was necessary and proportionate. Tax on withdrawals above the tax-free allowance was of minor importance because no evidence suggested that taxation would eliminate any real benefit to the creditor ([40]-[54]).
4. Default provision. Section 39(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 permitted a provision authorising Century Property’s solicitors to complete the necessary documentation. Such relief could be granted in anticipation of default where the debtor’s conduct showed that he would, or was likely to, refuse or delay compliance. It avoided further hearings and costs ([33]-[35], [55]-[57]).
5. The challenge to the validity of the Tomlin order was unsupported by witness or expert evidence. There was consequently no basis to doubt the validity of the settlement, judgment order or enforcement steps ([47]-[52]). The application was allowed and the orders were made as sought. Costs were reserved for separate determination ([58]).

First-instance enforcement decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.