Bernadette Rogers v Andrew Wills

A close family relationship does not prevent an intention to create legal relations. The question is one of fact, judged from the parties’ words and conduct. A contract for care may be concluded even though the price is not fixed, if the parties objectively agreed that reasonable remuneration would be paid.

In unjust enrichment, the four-question structure is a framework for analysis, not a series of freestanding legal tests. Free acceptance remains a recognised unjust factor. It requires knowledge, or constructive knowledge, that services are expected to be paid for and a reasonable opportunity to reject them which is not taken.

The claimant cared for her mother, Sheila, at home for about two and a half years. She claimed reasonable remuneration and expenses from Sheila’s estate, alleging a contract and, alternatively, unjust enrichment. The defendant, Sheila’s executor and the claimant’s sibling, denied liability and contended that the arrangements were familial and non-commercial.

The trial concerned liability only. The central issues were Sheila’s capacity and intention to create legal relations, whether a contract for care at a reasonable price arose, and whether the estate was alternatively liable in unjust enrichment.

1. Contract. Sheila had capacity in October 2017. Capacity was person-specific and decision-specific. Dementia, age, the existence of lasting powers of attorney, and limited management of financial affairs did not establish incapacity. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 required capacity to be presumed unless the contrary was proved.
2. The arrangement was intended to have legal effect. Sheila expressly wanted to be paid properly for care. The arrangement was a substantial long-term living and care commitment, not a short-term domestic or social arrangement. Family relationship alone did not rebut an intention to create legal relations.
3. The parties agreed the service to be provided and that remuneration would be paid, although no figure was fixed. The contract therefore required payment of a reasonable price. The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 applied, including its implied reasonable-charge provision.
4. Objectively, Sheila’s words and conduct conveyed an intention to contract. Even if her private intention differed, the objective principle governing contractual intention applied; the pleading did not create a novel cause of action.
5. Unjust enrichment. Alternatively, the estate was enriched by care provided at the claimant’s expense. The benefits were accepted with an opportunity to decline them and with knowledge that payment was expected. Free acceptance was therefore available as an unjust factor. It required more than mere receipt: the recipient must know, or reasonably be expected to know, that payment is expected and fail to take a reasonable opportunity to reject the benefit.
6. The claimant’s preferred analysis of failure of basis did not establish a separate alternative on the facts. If the parties shared a basis that the services would be paid for, that basis supported a contract. If there was no such agreement, the appropriate alternative was free acceptance.
7. Judgment was given for the claimant on liability, subject to a further hearing to determine quantum. The judge encouraged mediation and directed the parties to provide a draft minute of order for the quantum stage.

First-instance decision. The judgment records no earlier determination of the merits.