Security Industry Authority v Josoemag Services Ltd & Ors

Where a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 is amended after one year, the limitation period is not necessarily fixed at one year. It may be longer if the court considers that equitable under section 7(5)(b). Where the amendment creates no relation-back prejudice, the defendant must show that the relevant limitation period has clearly expired before the restrictions in CPR 17.4 are triggered.

In that situation, the court may grant permission under its ordinary case-management discretion. Alternatively, the amended claim may proceed under CPR 17.4(2) where it arises from the same or substantially the same facts. The comparison is principally made from the pleadings. Regulatory events should not be artificially divided into separate factual silos where the wider history is relevant to the alleged unlawfulness and proportionality.

The Security Industry Authority appealed from an order of Master Gidden dated 19 June 2024. The respondents had brought a claim for damages under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging that regulatory investigations, criminal proceedings and licensing decisions breached A1P1 of the Convention.

They amended the claim to add alleged breaches of articles 6, 8 and 14. The Authority argued that the additions were new claims made outside the one-year limitation period and did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts under CPR 17.4(2). The respondents relied on the absence of relation-back prejudice and the equitable extension contemplated by section 7(5)(b).

1. Appeal dismissed. The Master had been right to allow the amendments, although the reasoning of the appeal court differed.
2. Section 39 of the Limitation Act 1980 disapplies that Act to claims for which a limitation period is prescribed by another enactment. The Act therefore did not apply to the Human Rights Act claims, and section 35(1)(b) did not itself produce relation back.
3. The Human Rights Act is nevertheless an enactment for CPR 17.4(1)(b)(iii). The added Convention-right claims were new claims. However, section 7(5) prescribes a minimum one-year period and permits a longer period where equitable. Until that issue is determined, the applicable limitation period remains at large.
4. Where there is no relation-back prejudice, the claimant need not establish the absence of every arguable limitation defence before amendment. The defendant must show that the relevant limitation period has clearly expired. In this case the respondents’ undertaking not to rely on relation back was a complete answer to the alleged prejudice.
5. Alternatively, the amended claims arose from substantially the same facts as the original A1P1 claim. The pleadings showed a connected regulatory history. The investigations, information requests, criminal proceedings, suspension and licensing consequences were relevant to the proportionality of the A1P1 interference and to the additional Convention claims. They should not be treated as separate factual silos.
6. The court therefore had an ordinary discretion under CPR 17.1(2)(b). The amendments were made before service of the defence and caused no unfairness beyond work which would have been required had they been included initially. Permission was properly granted.

• High Court (King's Bench Division): appeal from Master Gidden’s order of 19 June 2024 dismissed. Permission to appeal had been granted by Johnson J on 12 February 2025.