SAC v Secretary of State for the Home Department

At the reasonable-grounds stage of the National Referral Mechanism, a decision-maker must assess the evidence holistically and apply the statutory guidance with care. Forced labour is not confined to physical force or to situations where a worker cannot leave because of ordinary economic necessity. Menace of a penalty may take psychological or financial forms, including threats of homelessness, destitution or withheld wages. Apparent consent may be undermined by vulnerability, coercion and the absence of a viable alternative. A decision which focuses on voluntary work or economic necessity without analysing contrary indicators, cumulatively and in context, is unlawful. The Administrative Court applies anxious scrutiny, while reviewing for public-law error rather than substituting its own view. A reconsideration request alleging failure to follow the guidance must be addressed on that basis.

The claimant, an Algerian national, sought judicial review of a Single Competent Authority decision that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that he was a victim of modern slavery. He challenged the decision and its reconsideration on five grounds, including error in the definitions of trafficking and forced labour, failure to follow the statutory guidance, inadequate reasoning and irrationality.

The claimant described long hours, poor conditions, withheld wages, threats of losing work and accommodation, and dependence on his employers. His account was broadly accepted as credible. The central issues were whether the decision unlawfully treated his circumstances as voluntary work arising from pure economic necessity, and whether the decision-maker had properly considered consent, vulnerability, menace of penalty and the guidance.

1. Claim allowed. The reasonable-grounds decision and the reconsideration decision were unlawful. The reasonable-grounds decision was quashed and the issue was to be decided afresh.
2. The relevant forced-labour inquiry requires consideration of whether work was exacted under the menace of any penalty and whether it was undertaken involuntarily. The statutory guidance recognises that consent may exist where a person feels there is no viable alternative, and that apparent consent is irrelevant where abuse of power or vulnerability, or other specified means, has been used.
3. Menace of penalty is a broad concept. It may include psychological pressure and financial consequences. The decision-maker therefore had to consider whether threats of homelessness, destitution and loss of support, together with withheld or unpaid wages, indicated that the claimant continued working under such a menace.
4. The decision-maker unlawfully concentrated on statements suggesting voluntary work and economic necessity. It failed to analyse, individually and cumulatively, accepted matters including excessive hours, inadequate breaks and accommodation, injuries, withheld wages, dependence, threats and fear of being left without shelter or means of survival. The guidance did not establish a hierarchy by which the reference to pure economic necessity displaced the provisions on consent and vulnerability.
5. The guidance’s qualification concerning pure economic necessity had to be read in full. The reference to a worker feeling unable to leave because of the real or perceived absence of employment alternatives supplied important context. Applying it too broadly risked undermining the protective purpose of the modern-slavery regime.
6. The decision was irrational because its reasoning contained demonstrable flaws and omitted legally relevant considerations. The court applied anxious scrutiny, but reviewed for legal error rather than correctness. Ground 1 was dismissed because it did not best identify the errors. Grounds 2, 3 and 5 succeeded. Ground 4 also succeeded because the reconsideration decision addressed the absence of additional evidence rather than the alleged failure to follow the guidance.
7. The court declined to treat R (Saadawi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department as analogous. It concerned a conclusive-grounds decision, different facts, and a decision-maker who had directed herself that menace of penalty could be subtle.

First-instance judicial review. The judgment records that permission was granted on 15 January 2025 by Melanie Plimmer sitting as a Judge of the High Court.