The Office Group Properties Limited & Anor v Persons Unknown

This is a first instance application for a Persons Unknown injunction to restrain trespass at commercial premises. The court applied the substantive and procedural tests derived from the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies & Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 and subsequent guidance in protestor injunction cases (notably Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown and Jockey Club Racecourses Ltd v Kidby). The Claimants satisfied notification requirements, including the minimum steps required by section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, but failed to show the compelling justification required for a Persons Unknown injunction.

• Key legal principles: the applicant must prove a strong probability of a tort being committed which will cause real harm and that the threat is real and imminent; procedural safeguards for Persons Unknown orders must be met.
• Material grounds for refusal: the encampment had ended before sealed proceedings could be served and the evidence did not establish a strong and imminent probability of recurrence; at best the prospect of return was speculative over several months, which made the application premature.

The Claimants are the leasehold holders of Tintagel House, a commercial office building which includes an Equality and Human Rights Commission office. Individuals associated with a group calling itself "Trans Kids Deserve Better" mounted a five day protest encampment at the front of Tintagel House in late May 2025. The Claimants issued proceedings seeking possession and, in the alternative, an injunction against Persons Unknown to restrain returning trespassory protestors from entering, occupying or remaining on the premises for protest purposes. The possession claim was abandoned because the encampment had ended.

The court was asked to grant a broad injunction, limited in time to 31 January 2026, with notification provisions designed to meet the procedural requirements identified by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. The intervenor Good Law Project was permitted to make submissions representing interests otherwise unrepresented by the absent defendants.

The principal issues were:

• whether the Claimants had complied with procedural notification requirements (including the Human Rights Act 1998 s.12(2));
• whether the substantive test for a Persons Unknown injunction was met (a compelling justification, a strong probability of tortious conduct causing real harm, and imminence of the threat); and
• whether any Article 10 or 11 Convention rights or other defences meant the injunction would be disproportionate.

The court found that the Claimants had taken reasonable steps to notify persons likely to be affected and thus satisfied the procedural requirements. Substantively, however, the evidence showed that the encampment had been signalled to end and had in fact ended before sealed documents could be served. There was no cogent evidence that organisers planned an immediate return; at best there was a speculative possibility of a recurrence within several months. That fell well short of the "strong probability" and imminence the Wolverhampton test requires. The judge therefore refused the injunction as premature and unnecessary to decide any Convention balancing, real harm or realistic defence issues. The judge noted that more narrowly drawn relief might have been appropriate if the evidential threshold had been met and that the Claimants could reapply if clear evidence of imminent recurrence emerged.

The application for an injunction is dismissed. Although the procedural notification requirements (including those identified in Wolverhampton and s.12(2) HRA) were met, the Claimants failed to demonstrate a compelling justification for a Persons Unknown injunction because they did not establish a strong probability that trespass would recur imminently; the protest had ended and the prospect of return was speculative and therefore the application was premature.