The Office Group Properties Limited & Anor v Persons Unknown

An injunction against persons unknown requires full and detailed evidence establishing a compelling justification. The claimant must show a strong probability that a tort will be committed, that it will cause real harm, and that the threat is real and imminent. A possibility of future trespass over several months is insufficient. “Imminent” means a threat arising soon; an application made substantially in advance may be premature. Procedural notification requirements may be satisfied even where the substantive test is not. Peaceful protest rights under Articles 10 and 11 do not ordinarily justify trespass on private land, although the court need not determine that issue where the evidential threshold for the injunction fails.

The claimants, leaseholders of commercial premises occupied in part by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, sought an injunction against persons unknown after a five-day trespassory protest and encampment ended. The proposed order would restrain entry, occupation and remaining on the premises for protest purposes until January 2026.

The protesters had departed before the sealed claim documents could be served. Good Law Project was permitted to intervene because the defendants were unrepresented and the intervention assisted procedural fairness. The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of a strong probability of imminent further trespass to justify a persons-unknown injunction.

1. Application dismissed. The claimants had satisfied the notification requirements. They emailed the protest group with the claim documents and posted the relevant material at the premises. This satisfied the common-law requirement identified in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies & Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 and, assuming Article 10 rights were engaged, section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. The substantive test was not met. Under Wolverhampton [2023] UKSC 47, the applicant must establish a compelling justification, a strong probability that a tort will be committed and real harm, together with a real and imminent threat. The additional protest-injunction requirements summarised in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (KB) did not overcome that evidential failure.
3. The completed protest did not constitute an ongoing tort. The claimants therefore had to show that the protesters were highly likely to return shortly or encourage others to do so. The evidence showed, at most, a possibility of recurrence during the following seven months. It did not establish a strong probability or imminence. “Imminent” meant occurring soon, and an application based on a protest expected only at the end of 2025 or early 2026 would be premature, applying Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43.
4. The court did not need to decide whether resumed protest would cause real harm or whether the protesters had a realistic defence. Nor was it necessary to determine the precise wording of the proposed order. The judge nevertheless observed that the draft was too broad because it could have prohibited protest against other occupiers of the premises.
5. A stay was refused. The injunction application had failed, the evidence of recurrence was indirect and circumstantial, and the proceedings should not remain pending over potential protesters.

The court also noted the principles in Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWCA 357 and DPP v Cuciuerean [2022] 3 WLR 446: Articles 10 and 11 do not ordinarily confer a right to trespass on private land, and property rights may justify proportionate restrictions. That issue was left undecided.