Yaa Foriwaa Appiah & Anor v Leeds City Council & Anor

A claim concerning allegedly unlawful detention and compulsory medical treatment should not be struck out or summarily dismissed merely because the claimant has not served expert psychiatric evidence. The court must assess the pleaded causes of action and the evidence available on the application. Statutory procedural failures, detention continuing beyond the period justified by the relevant criteria, or disproportionately aggressive treatment may potentially establish liability without proof of clinical negligence. Where the defendant seeks summary judgment without serving evidence addressing the circumstances of detention, the court may be unable to conclude that the claim has no real prospect of success. Directions permitting expert evidence do not require a party to serve it where the party does not intend to rely on it. Any sanction for late expert evidence should ordinarily be directed to reliance on that evidence, rather than striking out the entire claim.

The first claimant was detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 from 26 April to 23 August 2019 and received depot antipsychotic medication without consent. She alleged unlawful detention, breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, false imprisonment, procedural breaches and injury. Her husband brought a related Article 8 claim.

The claim against Leeds City Council had previously been dismissed. The remaining defendant, the responsible NHS Trust, applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment on limitation, pleading, abuse of process and non-compliance with directions, particularly the failure to serve expert evidence. The central issues were whether the claim was time-barred, whether it disclosed reasonable grounds and whether it had any real prospect of success.

1. D2’s application was dismissed. The claim was neither struck out nor summarily dismissed.
2. The claim form was sent to the court within the applicable one-year period under section 7(5)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Under PD7A paragraph 6.1, proceedings were brought for limitation purposes when the claim form was received by the court, even though issue was delayed by the court during the coronavirus pandemic. There was at least a triable issue on limitation. If necessary, the court would have extended time under section 7(5)(b) as equitable, having regard to the court’s delay and the defendant’s six-month delay in responding to the letter of claim.
3. The amended particulars complied with CPR 16.4(1)(a). Although the claim was imperfectly particularised, its legal basis was discernible: alleged procedural breaches, detention while the claimant was not suffering from a qualifying mental disorder, detention continuing beyond the justified period, and excessively aggressive administration of medication.
4. The claim was not a medical-negligence claim. It was at least possible for the claimant to succeed without proving negligence by the psychiatrists. A failure to follow statutory procedures, excessive detention or treatment contrary to Article 3 could potentially establish liability.
5. On the summary judgment application, the court had to assume the claimant’s evidence was correct where the defendant had served no factual evidence contradicting it. The defendant’s solicitor’s statement did not address the medical or factual issues. The claim therefore could not be said to have no real prospect of success. There was also a compelling reason for a trial because the claim involved deprivation of liberty and compulsory medication, while the responsible authority had provided no evidence explaining or justifying the decisions.
6. The expert-evidence directions granted permission to rely on expert evidence but did not compel either party to serve it. Even if the claimant had breached a direction, striking out the entire claim would be disproportionate. The usual sanction would concern reliance on late evidence, with possible costs consequences.
7. The claim was not an abuse of process. The defendant had not identified a recognised basis for that conclusion. The defendant was directed belatedly to serve a witness statement explaining its failure to engage with mediation within the period required by Master Stevens’s order. The parties were invited to agree consequential directions, including further preparation for trial.

The judgment records that the claim against Leeds City Council was dismissed after permission to proceed under section 139 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was refused: [2022] EWHC 2546 (KB). Permission to appeal was refused by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith on 11 August 2022. An application concerning later interlocutory orders remained extant before the Court of Appeal.