AAM, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bromley

When a local authority decides whether exceptional circumstances justify providing accommodation to a qualifying young person under Children Act 1989 s 24A(5), it must disregard accommodation provided, or potentially provided, under Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s 95. The Secretary of State’s asylum-support functions are residual. Treating that support as a reason for withholding local-authority assistance would risk an unlawful legislative deadlock.

The authority must nevertheless assess the young person’s circumstances rationally, including the suitability of existing accommodation, welfare, health, finances and the availability of alternative support. A pathway plan for a qualifying young person is not subject to a free-standing statutory duty to comply with the Care Leavers (England) Regulations 2010, although ordinary public-law duties continue to apply.

The claimant was an asylum-seeking young adult who had been accommodated by the defendant local authority for 11 days before turning 18. He therefore qualified for advice and assistance under Children Act 1989 ss 24 and 24A. He was subsequently housed by the Secretary of State in NASS accommodation under Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s 95.

The Council prepared a pathway plan but declined to provide accommodation, relying in part on the existence of NASS accommodation. The claimant challenged the plan on the relationship between the two statutory schemes, the meaning of exceptional circumstances, conventional public-law grounds, and compliance with the Care Leavers (England) Regulations 2010.

1. Relationship between the statutory schemes. The claim succeeded on the principal issue. The functions under Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s 95 are residual. They operate where no other support is available. The legislation must be interpreted coherently so that local authorities and the Secretary of State cannot each decline responsibility by relying on the possibility that the other will provide accommodation.
2. Accordingly, when deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist under Children Act 1989 s 24A(5), a local authority must not take into account the fact that a qualifying young person is being provided with, or might be provided with, NASS accommodation under s 95. That is a legally irrelevant consideration. The Council erred in law by relying on it, and the pathway plan was unlawful.
3. Exceptional circumstances. The adjective exceptional bears its ordinary meaning: unusual, special or uncommon, but not necessarily unique or very rare. On the hypothetical assumption that NASS accommodation could be taken into account, the claimant had not shown an unlawful approach to this issue. The remaining challenge was therefore one of rationality.
4. The Council’s assessment of finances, mental-health needs and accommodation did not fail the conventional public-law tests. It was entitled to take account principally of what the claimant told the assessing officer, to adopt a forward-looking approach, and to rely on proposed support, complaints procedures and review of the living pathway plan. The rationality challenge faced a high hurdle.
5. The 2010 Regulations did not impose a free-standing duty to prepare a compliant pathway plan for a qualifying young person. The Council was nevertheless required to comply with ordinary public-law duties, and on the facts it did so.
6. The Court granted declarations that the pathway plan was unlawful and that NASS accommodation could not be taken into account for s 24A(5) purposes. The Council was ordered to carry out a fresh needs assessment and produce a fresh pathway plan by 31 July 2025, or such later date as agreed. The claimant was awarded 60% of his costs.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was granted by a Deputy High Court Judge on 14 February 2025. The renewed application for permission on the first ground was refused. The substantive claim succeeded on the statutory interrelationship issue and was otherwise dismissed.