Review of Tariff in the case of Roree Cox, Re

On a review of a minimum term imposed on a young offender detained during Her Majesty’s Pleasure, the statutory scheme preserves the established three-limb approach. A reduction may be justified by exceptional progress, a serious and insufficiently mitigable risk to continued welfare or rehabilitation, or a new matter calling the original tariff into question. The statutory factors are not exhaustive.

Exceptional progress requires true exceptionality, assessed by reference to sustained conduct and development. A generalised risk, particularly where the custodial environment remains beneficial, is insufficient. Further psychiatric evidence will not ordinarily justify a tariff reduction where the sentencing judge already took the offender’s mental health into account. A possible case of diminished responsibility is ordinarily a matter for an appeal against conviction.

The applicant was convicted of murder committed when he was 17 and sentenced to detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure, with a minimum term of 14 years less time spent on remand. His tariff expiry date was 18 December 2026.

He applied for a reduction in the minimum term under sections 27A and 27B of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. He relied on exceptional progress in custody, risks to his welfare and rehabilitation, and further psychiatric evidence concerning autism spectrum disorder, schizophrenia and possible diminished responsibility.

The central issue was whether the statutory criteria for reducing the minimum term were satisfied.

1. Applicable test. Sections 27A and 27B of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 were introduced against the background of the established tariff-review scheme. They did not alter the nature of the applicable test. The matters identified in section 27B(4) are not exhaustive. The court therefore considered three possible grounds: exceptional progress, a serious and insufficiently mitigable risk to continued welfare or rehabilitation, and a new matter calling the original tariff into question.
2. Exceptional progress. The applicant had made substantial progress, including a lengthy period without adjudications, settled behaviour and trusted unescorted leave. That progress did not amount to true exceptionality. It had not been sustained across different institutions, and the evidence concerning relationships and work did not reach the required level.
3. Risk to continued development. The applicant remained in a beneficial regime at St Andrews Healthcare and his tariff would expire in about 18 months. The concerns about continued detention were partly based on a possible prison transfer, for which there was no evidence. In any event, the asserted risk was generalised and insufficiently serious to justify reduction.
4. New matter. The later psychiatric evidence was more developed than the evidence available at sentence. However, the sentencing judge had already considered the applicant’s mental health as significant mitigation, reducing culpability and preventing a finding that an intention to kill had been proved. The possibility of schizophrenia added support to that mitigation but did not call the minimum term into question or show that a substantially greater reduction was required. There was no direct evidence establishing diminished responsibility. Even if such evidence existed, that issue belonged to an appeal against conviction rather than a tariff review.
5. The application was refused. The tariff expiry date remained 18 December 2026.