Ilirian Zeqaj v Republic of Albania

For the passage-of-time bar under section 82 of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant question under the injustice limb is whether delay has made a fair trial impossible. The gravity of the alleged offence and the public interest in prosecution are relevant to oppression, but not to injustice. A breach of the reasonable-time requirement does not itself make extradition unjust if a fair trial remains possible.

For section 87, extradition is barred where the requesting state’s process has produced a flagrant denial of Article 6 rights. That may arise from the combined effect of denial of notice and chosen legal representation at a decisive appeal, an improperly constituted tribunal, and unjustified delay in a retrial.

The appellant faced a second extradition request from Albania for retrial on two murder charges dating from 1998 or 1999. He had previously been extradited, tried and acquitted. The acquittal was upheld on appeal, but the Albanian Supreme Court later quashed it and ordered a retrial after proceedings conducted without notice to the appellant or his chosen lawyer.

The District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003, who made an extradition order. The appellant appealed on grounds including passage of time, Articles 5, 6 and 8, and abuse of process. The central issues were whether delay made extradition unjust under section 82 and whether the history disclosed a flagrant breach of Article 6 under section 87.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The District Judge had erred in treating the gravity of the alleged offending or the public interest in prosecution as relevant to the injustice limb of section 82. The error infected that part of the decision, so the court reconsidered the issue afresh.
2. The applicable test was whether, by reason of the passage of time, a fair trial had become impossible. The test was not met. The principal eyewitness evidence had been recorded in 2014, and the appellant had been able to challenge it then. The court was not persuaded that subsequent delay made a fair trial impossible. Nor did the Supreme Court judgment prevent reliance on the alibi witnesses.
3. A breach of Article 6’s reasonable-time requirement did not determine the section 82 issue. Consistently with Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001), proceedings should not be dismissed solely for delay unless the delay meant that there could no longer be a fair hearing.
4. Ground 3 allowed. Section 87 required consideration of whether extradition would be compatible with Convention rights. A flagrant breach of Article 6 is one so fundamental that it nullifies or destroys the very essence of the right.
5. Three matters, taken together, established such a breach: the appellant was not notified of, or represented by his chosen lawyer at, the appeal which quashed his acquittal; the entire Supreme Court panel had been dismissed in the Albanian vetting process and was therefore not an independent and impartial tribunal; and the retrial had been subject to lengthy, substantially unexplained delay, with no clear end point.
6. The appeal therefore succeeded under section 87 and the appellant was discharged. The court did not determine the fresh-evidence application or the remaining grounds.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the District Judge’s decision was allowed under section 87 of the Extradition Act 2003; the appellant was discharged. The court rejected the passage-of-time ground and did not determine the remaining grounds.
• Earlier High Court decision: The appellant’s first appeal against an earlier extradition order was dismissed on 20 February 2013: [2013] EWHC 261 (Admin).
• District Judge: The appellant’s case was sent to the Secretary of State under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 in a judgment dated 21 May 2024. The Secretary of State made an extradition order on 12 July 2024.