S and T (Children: Return to Italy) (No.2), Re

An application to set aside a return order under the 1980 Hague Convention requires a fundamental change of circumstances which sufficiently undermines the basis of the original order. Repetition of matters already considered, disagreement with the earlier decision, or documents predating the order does not meet that threshold. Reopening a final return order is exceptional, and the summary nature of Hague Convention proceedings makes delay particularly significant. A stay will not be granted where permission to appeal has been refused, the protective return framework has been remade, and there is no merit in further delaying return.

The mother applied urgently under Family Procedure Rules Form D11 to set aside a return order concerning the parties’ two children and sought a stay of execution. The children had previously been ordered to return to Italy following a judgment rejecting the mother’s Article 13(b) exception under the 1980 Hague Convention: [2025] EWHC 835 (Fam).

Permission to appeal the original order was refused. A subsequent application to set aside was dismissed by HHJ Vavrecka, and permission to appeal that decision was also refused. The mother renewed her challenge, relying on alleged misrepresentations and material developments. The central questions were whether the threshold for reopening the return order was met and whether execution should be stayed.

1. Application dismissed. The return order requiring the children to return to Italy by 23:59 on 5 July 2025 remained in force. No stay was granted.
2. The applicable approach was that stated in Re B (A Child) (Abduction: Article 13(b)) [2020] EWCA Civ 1057. The court must first determine whether there has been a fundamental change of circumstances which sufficiently undermines the basis of the original return order. Only if that threshold is met is reconsideration or rehearing justified.
3. The threshold was not met. The mother repeated submissions made over the preceding three months. Those matters had already received judicial scrutiny from the trial judge, HHJ Vavrecka and the Court of Appeal. The documents filed contained nothing relevant which postdated HHJ Vavrecka’s order, and nothing sufficiently undermined the basis of the return order.
4. The summary and speedy character of Hague Convention proceedings was material. Repeated set-aside applications and permission applications had delayed the children’s return to their country of habitual residence and risked harm to their welfare. The judgment was directed to be translated and provided to the Italian courts and social services authorities.
5. Although a stay may ordinarily allow a party a short opportunity to approach the Court of Appeal, the refusal of permission to appeal and the existence of a comprehensive protective framework meant that there was no merit in granting a stay. The court therefore invited the respondent to draft an order dismissing the D11 application.

• High Court (Family Division): the original return order was made following the judgment reported at [2025] EWHC 835 (Fam).
• Court of Appeal: a stay was granted temporarily by Warby LJ on 25 April 2025, but permission to appeal the original order was refused by Moylan LJ on 12 May 2025.
• High Court: HHJ Vavrecka dismissed the mother’s subsequent set-aside application on 7 June 2025 and remade the return order on 27 June 2025.
• Court of Appeal: Moylan LJ refused permission to appeal the June decision on 24 June 2025.
• High Court (Family Division): the present application to set aside and for a stay was dismissed.