N (A Child) (Deprivation of Liberty Orders), Re

Deprivation of liberty orders under the inherent jurisdiction are welfare orders which significantly interfere with a young person’s liberty. They may be made only where deprivation is lawful, necessary and proportionate to secure welfare. The order is permissive: it identifies restrictions which may be used if required, rather than prescribing restrictions which must be imposed. Applicants must use the least restrictive option and review restrictions as circumstances change. Effective cases require coordinated work between social care, health services and other agencies, together with a clear step-down plan towards independence.

Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council applied for permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and for authorisation to deprive N, then aged 17, of her liberty. N had a history of trauma, absconding, self-harm and suicidal behaviour. She fell outside the practical operation of the statutory schemes governing secure accommodation, mental-health detention and capacity-based detention.

The court made interim orders authorising significant restrictions while suitable accommodation and support were found. Following multidisciplinary work, a step-down plan and transition arrangements, N’s circumstances improved. By the final hearing she was 18, had capacity, and all parties agreed that continued court authorisation was unnecessary.

1. Nature of the jurisdiction. The inherent jurisdiction is a welfare jurisdiction. The young person’s welfare is paramount. A deprivation of liberty order may be made only where the restriction is lawful, necessary and proportionate to secure welfare. The order must also contain an educational element for the purposes of Art 5 (1)(d) ECHR.
2. Permissive and least restrictive orders. The restrictions authorised are a menu of measures which the applicant may use if necessary and proportionate. They are not a prescriptive list of restrictions which must be imposed. Applicants must use the least restrictive option and must not apply authorised restrictions rigidly or more extensively than necessary.
3. Role of the inherent jurisdiction. The jurisdiction may fill a statutory lacuna where a young person presents a serious risk of harm but cannot be detained under the relevant mental-health, capacity or secure-accommodation regimes. Its use does not remove the need to seek suitable accommodation and support, or to keep the restrictions under review.
4. Case management and welfare planning. The progress of the case demonstrated the importance of multidisciplinary working, the young person’s participation, a timetabled step-down plan and regular review of each restriction. Planning for adulthood and the implementation of care-leaver duties should run alongside the proceedings.
5. Outcome. The application was ultimately dealt with by consent. By 21 May 2025 N no longer required court-authorised deprivation of liberty. The proceedings were brought to an end.