Huda Ammori, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an application for interim relief against a proscription order, the court applies the American Cyanamid framework. Public-law cases do not attract a uniform, heightened merits threshold. The public interest in enforcing an apparently valid law remains a powerful factor, particularly where national security is involved and Parliament has affirmed the order. The court must assess the prima facie strength of the challenge together with the gravity of the consequences of refusing relief, and then balance the competing harms. The Terrorism Act 2000 permits conduct intended to influence government for a political cause to constitute terrorism where it involves serious damage to property, even without violence against persons. The statutory language cannot be narrowed by vague implied exceptions for civil-society or dissent groups.

The claimant, a founder of Palestine Action, sought interim relief preventing or suspending a draft order proscribing the organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000. The order had been approved by both Houses of Parliament and was due to come into force on 5 July 2025. The claimant argued that the order was ultra vires, disproportionate under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, based on irrelevant or insufficient considerations, contrary to policy and the public sector equality duty, and made without prior consultation. The Secretary of State relied on the statutory de-proscription and appeal scheme and the public interest in immediate enforcement. The central issues were whether there was a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lay pending the permission hearing.

1. Jurisdiction and form of relief. The court had jurisdiction in principle to suspend the legal effect of a proscription order after it had been made, even though the order had been affirmed by both Houses. A stay or, if necessary, an interim declaration could provide effective relief pending the permission hearing.
2. Interim-relief test. The basic framework was supplied by American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd. There was no uniform heightened merits threshold in public-law cases. The court had to consider whether there was a serious question to be tried, the prima facie strength of the claim, the gravity of the consequences if relief were refused, and the balance of public and private harm. In a national-security case, considerable respect was due to the executive’s assessment of risk and weight, although the court retained responsibility for the balance.
3. Merits. The challenge based on an alleged statutory exclusion for a direct-action or civil-disobedience network was weak. Sections 1 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 use clear language. Serious damage to property may constitute terrorism when the statutory purposes are present, even without violence or danger to life. Neither the principle of legality nor unincorporated international law justified adding a vague restriction for civil-society or dissent groups. The organisation definition was broad enough to include an association or combination of persons without centralised command or hierarchy.
4. The Article 10 and 11 challenge did raise a serious question to be tried because proscription was likely to interfere with protected rights and proportionality remained open, particularly pending disclosure of open and closed material. The alternative-remedy argument, and the challenges based on irrelevant considerations, policy, equality and consultation, could not at this stage dispose of the claim.
5. Balance. The order was intended to disrupt conduct which the Secretary of State assessed as posing national-security risks. Immediate enforcement had been endorsed by Parliament. Although proscription could cast a long shadow over legitimate speech and create stigma and criminal consequences, those harms did not outweigh the strong public interest in maintaining the order. The application for interim relief was refused. Any very short-term application pending an appeal was to be made directly to the Court of Appeal.