William Malone, R (on the application of) v Llandudno Magistrates' Court

A magistrates’ court has a broad discretion to adjourn a summary trial, but the starting point is that the trial should proceed. An application made on the day of trial requires rigorous scrutiny, and the decision must be cogently reasoned. The court must consider the case history, expedition, witness attendance, the parties’ interests, the nature and consequences of the delay, and responsibility for the need to adjourn.

Judicial review may intervene where the magistrates fail to apply that approach, omit relevant considerations, or give reasons insufficient to demonstrate lawful decision-making. Where the only lawful and rational decision would have been to refuse the adjournment, the reviewing court may remit the case with a direction to acquit. The touchstone is the interests of justice and the risk of unfairness.

The claimant faced a charge under section 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 after refusing to provide a specimen of breath. He relied on a reasonable-excuse defence based on post-traumatic stress disorder and a panic attack.

On the day fixed for trial, the prosecution sought an adjournment because two material police witnesses were unavailable. The magistrates granted the application, finding fault on both sides, and relisted the trial. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the decision was unlawful, irrational and inadequately reasoned. The central issues were whether the magistrates had applied the correct approach to adjournment applications and what relief should follow.

1. The claim succeeded. The magistrates’ decision to adjourn was quashed. The court held that the magistrates had failed to apply the correct legal approach and had not subjected the prosecution application to the required rigorous scrutiny.
2. Section 10(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 confers a discretionary power to adjourn. That discretion must be exercised consistently with the Criminal Procedure Rules, the overriding objective, the Criminal Practice Directions 2023 and the established authorities. The starting point is that the trial should proceed. The court must consider expedition, the case history, the evidence, witness attendance, the parties’ interests, the consequences of delay and the nature and gravity of any fault.
3. The reasons may be concise, but they must be sufficiently detailed and cogent to show that the correct approach was applied. The magistrates’ brief reference to fault on both sides and the interests of justice did not show that they had considered the previous refusal of the claimant’s adjournment application, the prosecution’s recent assurance that it was trial ready, the late service and absence of PS Hughes, or the relative responsibility for the witnesses’ absence.
4. The prosecution’s failure was particularly significant. PS Hughes’s evidence was relevant to the statutory-warning issue and the reasonable-excuse defence, and his statement was served only on the morning of trial. The prosecution had also resisted the claimant’s earlier adjournment application on the basis that it was ready for trial. Proper scrutiny of the circumstances led to the conclusion that the only lawful and rational decision was to refuse the adjournment.
5. The court had a wide but principled discretion as to relief. A direction to acquit was not confined to cases where the prosecution had expressly conceded that it would offer no evidence. The touchstone was the interests of justice and the real risk of unfairness. Although caution was required, the prosecution should not obtain the practical benefit of an unlawful adjournment. Given the prosecution’s failings, the misleading trial-ready assurance, the likely delay and the claimant’s circumstances, the case was remitted with a direction to acquit.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The claimant challenged the decision of Llandudno Magistrates’ Court to adjourn his trial. The Administrative Court quashed that decision and remitted the matter with a direction to acquit.