Save Wimbledon Park Ltd, R (on the application of) v Mayor of London

In planning cases, difficulties in implementing an authorised development are ordinarily immaterial. They may nevertheless be material where the facts make them relevant to the planning merits. Whether they are relevant is generally a matter for the decision-maker, subject to rationality review.

A need for development does not automatically make deliverability material merely because the need is relied on in a very special circumstances case. Planning permission establishes acceptability in land-use terms and does not override property rights or statutory restrictions.

Under paragraph 202 of the National Planning Policy Framework, deliberate neglect or damage requires a conscious decision to fail to care for, or to harm, a heritage asset. Under paragraph 103, the exceptions are disjunctive, and commercial sports provision is not excluded.

The claimant sought judicial review of planning permissions granted by the Mayor of London for the expansion of the Wimbledon Championships onto Wimbledon Park Golf Course. The site was subject to restrictive covenants and was assumed for planning purposes to be subject to a statutory recreational trust.

The claimant alleged that the decision-maker had unlawfully disregarded deliverability, failed to apply paragraph 202 of the National Planning Policy Framework concerning deliberate neglect or damage to a heritage asset, and misinterpreted paragraph 103 concerning open space, sport and recreation.

The central issues were whether the alleged legal impediments were material planning considerations, whether the heritage policy was engaged, and whether the proposed development satisfied paragraphs 103(b) or (c).

1. Claim dismissed. The decision-maker’s treatment of deliverability was a rational planning judgment.
2. Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, materiality involves two questions: whether the matter is capable in law of being material, which is for the court, and whether it is material to the particular application, which is for the decision-maker subject to Wednesbury review.
3. Legal obstacles to implementation are ordinarily immaterial. They may be considered where the facts make them relevant, for example where benefits are time-sensitive or competing sites make comparative deliverability significant. There is no rule that deliverability is always material where a development is said to meet a need or where the need supports very special circumstances. The officers had expressly considered the issue and were entitled to conclude that timing and deliverability did not affect the weight of the benefits.
4. Planning permission determines land-use acceptability. It does not override property rights, restrictive covenants or statutory restrictions. A permission may therefore lawfully be granted even if further steps are required before development can proceed.
5. Paragraph 202 of the National Planning Policy Framework was adequately considered. Deliberate neglect or damage requires a conscious decision to fail to care for, or to harm, the heritage asset. The erosion of heritage features through the continuation of a lawful golf-course use did not engage the policy.
6. The exceptions in paragraph 103 of the National Planning Policy Framework are disjunctive. The proposed development was capable of constituting alternative sports and recreational provision under paragraph 103(c), notwithstanding its commercial character. Paragraph 103(b) also required consideration of both quantity and quality, and the officer’s report had considered both.

Grounds 1, 2 and 3 were dismissed. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment records that permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Lang J on 7 February 2025.