Braunford LLP & Anor v Pierre Allain

An anonymity order is available only where non-disclosure is strictly necessary both to secure the proper administration of justice and to protect the applicant’s interests. Open justice includes the public identification of parties, and there is no lower threshold merely because the application is made during interlocutory proceedings. The applicant bears the burden and must provide clear and cogent evidence. Possible damage to employment, professional autonomy or reputation, and the fact that serious allegations may later be rejected at trial, will ordinarily be insufficient. The court must balance the applicant’s Article 8 interests against open justice and freedom of expression, while avoiding an extension of anonymity by analogy.

The claimants brought proceedings concerning alleged misuse of confidential information. The defendant applied under CPR 39.2(4) for anonymity and reporting restrictions. He relied principally on the risk that disclosure of his identity would cause his prospective employer to withdraw an employment offer, impair his ability to fund and defend the claim, and expose him to reputational prejudice which he could not fully explain because of confidentiality restrictions.

The claimants opposed the application, relying on the paramount importance of open justice and the absence of clear and cogent evidence establishing necessity. The court considered whether the defendant’s employment and Article 8 interests justified continuing anonymity pending an expedited trial.

The anonymity application was dismissed.

1. Statutory threshold. CPR 39.2(4) requires the court to order non-disclosure only where it considers it necessary both to secure the proper administration of justice and to protect the person’s interests. The emphatic wording imposes strict and limited preconditions.
2. Open justice. Open justice requires hearings to be public, fully reportable so far as possible, and parties to be named. Any derogation must be strictly necessary in the interests of justice. The burden lies firmly on the party seeking anonymity, supported by clear and cogent evidence. There is no reduced threshold at an interlocutory stage.
3. Relevant interests. Article 8 may extend to the right to choose and follow a profession. Employment and reputational consequences may therefore be relevant to the balancing exercise. They do not, however, displace the demanding necessity test. The test does not depend on whether the applicant is a claimant or defendant.
4. Application. Even taking the defendant’s evidence at face value, the risk of losing future employment and the prejudice caused by confidentiality restrictions did not establish a sufficiently clear and cogent case. Employers and prospective employers could be expected to approach the litigation with circumspection and common sense. The defendant could explain that he rejected the allegations and expected vindication at trial.
5. The court was concerned that granting anonymity on these grounds would invite applications in many commercial cases and seriously erode open justice. The defendant’s Article 8 interests and risk of reputational damage were outweighed by the requirements of open justice, including the naming of parties. The application was dismissed.

The judgment records an earlier interlocutory judgment, [2025] EWHC 1934 (Ch), which expedited the trial and extended the defendant’s time for filing and serving his defence. No appeal is stated.