Re V (Profound Disabilities)

Care and supervision required because of profound disabilities do not necessarily amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR. The court must assess whether the restrictions are State actions depriving the person of liberty, or measures forming part of necessary care provision. Where the person cannot leave the placement by reason of enduring disabilities, rather than State-imposed restrictions, the inherent jurisdiction need not be invoked and a Deprivation of Liberty Order is unnecessary.

Rochdale Borough Council applied under section 100 of the Children Act 1989 for permission to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and for a Deprivation of Liberty Order concerning V, a 15-year-old looked-after child subject to a Care Order and affected by profound disabilities and complex medical needs.

The proposed arrangements included constant supervision, assistance with personal and intimate care, monitoring, and restrictions during transport and community activities. A previous order had been made before Peterborough City Council v SM [2024] EWHC 493 (Fam). The central issue was whether the arrangements constituted a State deprivation of liberty requiring court authorisation.

1. Application refused. The Local Authority did not require permission under section 100 of the Children Act 1989 to invoke the inherent jurisdiction, and no Deprivation of Liberty Order was necessary.
2. The assessment under Article 5 ECHR is fact-specific. Close and constant supervision, personal care, monitoring and assistance may intrude on privacy, but they do not necessarily interfere with liberty and security of the person where they are measures designed to meet care needs.
3. The court rejected the proposed distinction from Peterborough City Council v SM [2024] EWHC 493 (Fam). The relevant principle applied equally where V had limited communication and understanding but could express basic states such as happiness, sadness and pain.
4. V could not leave his placement of his own volition because of his enduring disabilities. The inability to leave therefore resulted from his disabilities, rather than an action of the State. The restrictions necessarily implemented to supervise him, monitor him and provide personal care did not infringe Articles 2, 3 or 5 ECHR.
5. The decision did not detract from the Local Authority’s duty to provide suitable care and respond appropriately to V’s complex needs. The court also accepted that supervision of V’s mobile phone was an appropriate exercise of parental responsibility under the existing Care Order and did not require deprivation authorisation.