London Borough of X v Mrs Z & Anor

In wardship proceedings concerning a capacitous child aged seventeen, the High Court may determine residence under its inherent jurisdiction where the parties accept that jurisdiction and no coercive or deprivation-of-liberty order is sought. The child’s welfare remains the paramount consideration, with considerable regard paid to his ascertainable wishes and feelings. Findings of fact are not necessarily required to make the welfare decision where the child retains liberty to choose where to live and the decision does not unlawfully interfere with parental Article 8 rights. Given the child’s age and capacity, limited justification may suffice for interference with a parent’s Article 8 family-life rights. The court ordered that the child remain living with his father, with progressively reduced support and supervision for contact with his mother.

The local authority applied under the High Court’s wardship jurisdiction concerning ZE, a seventeen-year-old child who had lived principally with his mother. Public law proceedings had earlier resulted in an interim care order and a recovery order, after which ZE was placed with his father. Wardship was subsequently granted because ZE was approaching the statutory age at which a care or supervision order could no longer be made.

The mother sought ZE’s return or unsupervised contact. ZE expressed a wish to return to her, while the Guardian supported his remaining with his father. The central issues were whether ZE should live with his mother or father and, if he remained with his father, what restrictions should govern contact.

1. Jurisdiction. The court accepted the parties’ position that it could determine ZE’s residence in wardship. Wardship forms part of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, under which the court retains ultimate responsibility for a ward. The court noted the statutory prohibition on care or supervision orders for a child who has turned seventeen, but did not determine that issue because no party challenged the continuation of wardship or the court’s jurisdiction.
2. Applicable approach. ZE had capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to decide where to reside and remained at liberty to leave his father’s home. His welfare was paramount, with considerable regard paid to his ascertainable wishes and feelings. Because no deprivation of liberty or coercive order was sought, and because of ZE’s age and capacity, it was unnecessary to make findings of fact as a legal precondition to the welfare decision. The court nevertheless made factual findings to clarify the background for ZE and the local authority.
3. Article 8. Mrs Z’s Article 8 rights remained relevant, but her parental rights existed for the child’s benefit and were limited by ZE’s age and capacity. The adult-to-adult family-life authorities supported the conclusion that only limited justification was required for lawful interference with her rights.
4. Welfare outcome. ZE’s welfare favoured remaining with his father. He was settled, had more consistent medical care, his own bedroom, improved social opportunities and a realistic prospect of returning to formal education. His expressed wish to return to his mother was weighed against the Guardian’s analysis and his practical presentation of his future at college.
5. Contact and orders. Contact was to progress from supervised contact to community contact with light-touch support, followed by unsupervised telephone contact. Support and supervision were to end by 30 September 2025, subject to review. Wardship was continued until a review hearing in October 2025, with liberty to apply if intervention became necessary.

This was a first-instance wardship determination. Public law proceedings had been issued in February 2025; an interim care order and recovery order were made by District Judge Hudd on 3 March 2025, and ZE was made a ward of court by Poole J on 24 March 2025. The present court determined residence, contact and continuation of wardship.