Daniel Hesketh (Contempt in the Face of the Court), Re

Committal proceedings for contempt in the face of the court may proceed in the defendant’s absence where the defendant has received sufficient notice, has had a fair opportunity to obtain representation and prepare, has chosen not to attend, and further delay is unlikely to secure attendance or advance fairness. The court must balance the defendant’s Article 6 rights, the interests of justice, prejudice to witnesses, and the need to deal with contempt fairly and expeditiously.

For sentence, the court assesses seriousness by culpability and harm, considers whether a fine is sufficient, and imposes the shortest custodial term that properly reflects the contempt where custody is necessary. Sustained abuse, threats of violence against a judge and the judge’s family, and serious disruption may justify immediate imprisonment.

The proceedings arose from conduct by Daniel Hesketh at a private family-law hearing before District Judge Gray on 7 January 2025. The allegations comprised abuse of the judge and others in court, repeated interruptions and disrespect, threats including threats of physical violence, and disruption of the proceedings.

After repeated difficulties serving the committal papers and securing Mr Hesketh’s attendance, the court proceeded in his absence on 13 June 2025 and found each allegation proved to the criminal standard. The sentencing hearing was adjourned to give him further opportunities to obtain advice, attend and offer mitigation. He again did not attend. Parallel criminal proceedings concerning some of the same conduct were due to be sentenced later. The issues were whether sentencing should proceed in his absence and, if so, what sentence was appropriate.

1. Proceeding in absence. The court adopted the guidance in Sanchez v Oboz concerning committal hearings in a respondent’s absence. The defendant had been served by authorised alternative means, had sufficient time to prepare, knew the seriousness and possible consequences of the hearing, and had chosen not to attend. He could have attended, sought an adjournment or arranged representation. Further adjournment was unlikely to secure attendance and would prejudice witnesses and the administration of justice. Proceeding to sentence in his absence was therefore compatible with his Article 6 rights and the overriding objective.
2. Parallel criminal proceedings. It was not axiomatic that the criminal proceedings should take precedence. The contempt proceedings were more advanced, covered the full range of conduct, and enabled the High Court to assess the impact on the administration of justice. The court had sufficient powers to sentence without awaiting the magistrates’ proceedings.
3. Sentencing principles. The court adopted the approach in Re Greg Hazeltine, including the principles identified in HM Attorney General v Crosland: assess seriousness by culpability and harm; consider first whether a fine suffices; if custody is required, impose the shortest proper term; give due weight to mitigation and the impact on others; and consider suspension after fixing the appropriate term.
4. The contempt was at the higher end of abuse and disruption of family-court proceedings. The sustained and escalating conduct, threats against the judge and his family, absence of remorse or apology, and failure to engage with the proceedings were aggravating features. The stressful family context was mitigating but did not excuse the conduct.
5. The minimum terms imposed for abuse, interruption and disrespect, threats, and disruption were respectively four months, one month, four months and three months, all concurrent. The defendant was committed to prison for four months. Suspension was refused because the contempt was sufficiently serious to require immediate custody.

First-instance committal and sentencing decision transferred from the Family Court sitting in St Helens. The judgment records a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) under Administration of Justice Act 1960 section 13(2)(c), read with Senior Courts Act 1981 section 53(3).