Teledyne UK Ltd v Mary Ensell & Anor

In civil contempt proceedings arising from protest activity, liability requires notice through proper service, whereas actual knowledge is relevant to sanction. Where actual knowledge is disputed and concerns a material fact of the breach, the claimant must establish it to the criminal standard; the defendant does not bear a civil burden merely because the issue concerns mitigation.

Sanction requires assessment of seriousness, culpability and harm by an approach analogous to criminal sentencing. Conscientious protest motives reduce culpability but do not authorise breach of court orders. Custody may be appropriate where the custody threshold is narrowly crossed, but suspension should be considered where the protest was peaceful, the contemnor has strong mitigation, presents no public risk and shows a realistic prospect of rehabilitation.

Teledyne applied to commit Mary Ensell and Harry Wade for contempt arising from admitted breaches of a protest injunction at its Shipley site on 28 January 2025. The defendants accepted six breaches but disputed having actual knowledge of the injunction before or during the initial stages of the protest.

The central issues were the burden and standard of proof applicable to actual knowledge for sanction purposes, the relevance of the defendants’ lack of knowledge before 7am, and the appropriate penalty. The court also assessed the peaceful nature and limited practical harm of the protest, the defendants’ personal mitigation, their admissions and remorse, and the totality of the six breaches.

1. Actual knowledge. Liability for contempt required notice through proper service, not actual knowledge. Actual knowledge was relevant to sanction. The distinction was recognised in Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport & High Speed Two (HS2) Limited [2021] EWCA Civ 357 and National Highways Limited v Kirin & Ors [2023] EWHC 3000 (KB).
2. Burden and standard. The disputed issue concerned facts of the offence and was highly material to sentence. It was not extraneous mitigation falling within a category where the defendant bears a civil burden. The claimant therefore had to prove actual knowledge to the criminal standard, by direct evidence or inference. The same result would have followed under the alternative approach advanced by the claimant.
3. Findings. Neither defendant knew of the injunction before the action or when it began. Both acquired sufficient actual knowledge at about 7am, when security staff told them that a court injunction was being breached and that contempt proceedings and serious consequences might follow. They nevertheless remained attached for approximately five and a half hours.
4. Sanction. Applying HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] 4 WLR 103, the court considered seriousness, culpability, harm, mitigation, remorse, character and the effect of committal on persons in the contemnors’ care. The protester’s conscientious motives warranted greater clemency but did not excuse disobedience. The limited harm, peaceful conduct, lack of planning involvement, absence of prior convictions and genuine remorse materially reduced culpability.
5. The custody threshold was marginally crossed because the protest continued after actual knowledge. A fine was insufficient, but immediate custody was unnecessary. The appropriate term after trial was 28 days for each defendant, reduced by 25 per cent for the admissions to 21 days, suspended for 12 months. The suspension was conditional on compliance with the specified prohibitions in the order dated 25 July 2025.