Noel Anthony Clarke v Guardian News and Media Limited

The court (Steyn J) dismissed Noel Clarke’s libel claim against Guardian News & Media Ltd. The Guardian succeeded in establishing the statutory defences of truth (s.2 Defamation Act 2013) and publication on a matter of public interest (s.4 Defamation Act 2013) in relation to the first article. The judge found that, on the meanings previously determined by Johnson J, there were strong grounds to believe that Clarke had engaged in a pattern of sexually improper behaviour, unwanted touching, inappropriate sexual comments, bullying of junior colleagues and misuse of images and rushes.

The court also held that the claimant had not satisfied the s.1(1) 2013 Act serious-harm requirement in respect of the second to eighth articles. The claimant’s separate data protection claim was withdrawn during the trial.

Key legal principles applied: (i) the defendant must prove substantial truth of the court-determined meaning (s.2); (ii) where the defendant pleads publication on a matter of public interest, the court asks whether the statement was on a matter of public interest, whether the defendant actually believed publication was in the public interest, and whether that belief was reasonable (s.4); and (iii) the 2013 Act s.1 serious-harm threshold is applied to each publication/statement.

The claimant was a well-known actor, writer, director and producer who brought libel (and originally a data protection) claim against the Guardian arising from a series of eight publications beginning 29 April 2021 which alleged years of sexual harassment, groping, bullying and misuse of images by him.

Procedural posture: first instance trial (six weeks) to determine liability on the libel pleadings and the statutory defences following a prior meaning judgment (Johnson J) fixing the natural and ordinary meanings of the articles.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: libel damages (and a withdrawn data protection claim); claimant alleged publications conveyed defamatory imputations not substantially true and wanted to recover losses.

Issues framed:

• whether the Guardian had proved the substantial truth of the meanings (s.2 Defamation Act 2013);
• whether the Guardian established the statutory public-interest defence (s.4 Defamation Act 2013) — (a) whether the publications were on matters of public interest, (b) whether the decision‑makers actually believed publication was in the public interest, and (c) whether that belief was reasonable; and
• whether the second to eighth articles satisfied the s.1(1) serious‑harm threshold.

Facts and evidence (concise): the Guardian’s investigation drew on numerous primary sources (named, anonymised and confidential journalistic sources) who described unwanted sexual approaches, touching, propositions, pressure in auditions and on closed sets, bullying and the taking / retention and limited sharing of explicit images and video rushes. A lengthy evidential examination of dozens of witnesses (for both parties), contemporaneous messages and recordings took place. Some witnesses declined to attend trial and their written statements were adduced as hearsay; others who were invited to attend were not made available by the claimant.

Court’s reasoning: the court applied the common law approach to substantial truth and the statutory tests in the Defamation Act 2013. The judge assessed each cluster of allegations and the credibility of witnesses, giving due weight to contemporaneous documents, recordings and the witness demeanour. On the truth defence, the judge concluded that, on the precise meanings found at the earlier meaning trial, the Guardian had proved a pattern of misconduct (multiple instances across years) by reference to a variety of incidents and corroboration. On the public‑interest defence, the court found the subject matter (allegations against a prominent industry figure and the wider risk created by the award/empowerment he received) to be a matter of public interest; the editor‑in‑chief and the Guardian’s senior editors and reporters honestly believed publication was in the public interest and that belief was objectively reasonable having regard to the investigation and editorial process (including verification efforts, legal input and editorial judgement). Finally, the court held that the claimant had not properly pleaded or proved serious harm in respect of the second to eighth articles.

The claim is dismissed. The court found that the Guardian had established the statutory defence of truth under s.2 of the Defamation Act 2013 in respect of the first article (and that the meanings of the other articles did not add materially beyond the first, save where noted). Alternatively, the Guardian established the statutory public interest defence under s.4 of the Defamation Act 2013: the publications were on matters of public interest, the Guardian’s decision‑makers honestly believed publication was in the public interest, and that belief was objectively reasonable in all the circumstances. Further, the claimant failed to prove the s.1(1) serious‑harm threshold for the second to eighth articles. The data protection claim was withdrawn.