Noel Anthony Clarke v Guardian News and Media Limited

For the statutory truth defence, the defendant must prove the substantial truth of the imputation conveyed by each defamatory statement. Where the meaning alleges strong grounds to believe misconduct, the defendant must prove the primary facts giving rise objectively to those grounds. A general allegation of a pattern of misconduct cannot ordinarily be established by one isolated instance. The court must assess the evidence as a whole, while avoiding the fallacy that multiple allegations themselves establish truth.

For serious harm under the Defamation Act 2013, each distinct statement must generally be assessed separately. The cumulative impact of separate articles conveying similar allegations cannot ordinarily be relied upon to satisfy the threshold for each statement.

The public interest defence requires an objective public-interest subject, an actual belief in publication’s public interest, and a reasonable belief assessed in all the circumstances, allowing appropriate latitude for editorial judgment.

Noel Anthony Clarke brought libel and data protection claims against Guardian News and Media Limited concerning eight articles and a podcast alleging sexual harassment, bullying, abuse of power, professional misconduct and related conduct.

The meanings of the publications had been determined at an earlier meaning trial by Johnson J in Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2023] EWHC 2734 (KB). The trial concerned whether the Guardian established the statutory truth defence under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, the public interest defence under section 4, and, for the second to eighth articles, serious harm under section 1.

The central issues were whether the pleaded allegations were substantially true, whether each publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm, and whether publication was reasonably believed to be in the public interest.

1. Disposition. The Guardian established both the truth defence under section 2 and the public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. The libel claim was dismissed. The data protection claim had been withdrawn. In any event, the serious-harm requirement was not established for the second to eighth articles.
2. Meaning. The meanings determined before trial were clear and precise. The court rejected attempts to impose statutory or dictionary definitions of harassment on those meanings. The question was the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, not a technical statutory meaning.
3. Serious harm. Section 1 required assessment by reference to each statement, here each article, rather than by aggregating the impact of all the Articles. The fact that the first article’s mass publication could be considered collectively for serious harm did not establish serious harm for the separate statements in the later articles. The Claimant neither properly pleaded nor proved harm attributable to each of those articles.
4. Truth. Under section 2, the Guardian had to establish the substantial truth of the first article’s meaning, including its high Chase level-two character of strong grounds to believe the misconduct occurred. The evidence had to establish the primary facts and matters giving rise objectively to those grounds. The court could rely on incidents not mentioned in the article where they supported the general imputation, but events after publication were inadmissible. A single instance would not establish the alleged pattern of serial abuse. The court assessed the evidence in the round, while rejecting the inference that the number of allegations itself proved a kernel of truth.
5. The court found established numerous instances of sexual harassment, unwanted sexual contact, bullying, sexually inappropriate conduct, professional misconduct, and taking or sharing explicit images or footage without consent. That evidence was more than sufficient to establish the substantial truth of the first article and, if necessary, the other Articles, including the allegation concerning students being encouraged to remove clothing during improvisation workshops.
6. Public interest. Section 4 involved three questions: whether the statement concerned a matter of public interest; whether the defendant believed publication was in the public interest; and whether that belief was reasonable. The first article concerned the use of power by a prominent figure in the film and television industry, sexual misconduct in the workplace, and the industry’s failure to protect women. The Editor-in-Chief honestly believed publication was in the public interest. That belief was reasonable having regard to the investigation, source assessment, corroboration, opportunity to reply, presentation, tone and the allowance required for editorial judgment.
7. The Claimant’s data protection claim was withdrawn and required no determination. The libel and data protection claims were dismissed.

• High Court, King's Bench Division: The meaning of the Articles was determined at an earlier trial by Johnson J in Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2023] EWHC 2734 (KB).
• Court of Appeal: The Claimant’s appeal against a case-management order was dismissed, and permission to appeal from dismissal of a strike-out application was refused: [2025] EWCA Civ 164 and [2025] EWCA Civ 187.
• High Court, King's Bench Division: After trial, the libel and data protection claims were dismissed.