Federal Government of Nigeria & Anor v Louis Emovbira Williams

An anti-enforcement injunction is available to restrain a party from enforcing a judgment, including an English judgment, where that relief is just and convenient. The jurisdiction operates in personam and is not confined to cases involving fraud, although such injunctions are rare because of delay and comity. An interim injunction sought on the ground that enforcement would be vexatious and oppressive ordinarily requires a high probability of success at trial where the order would effectively determine the dispute. A lower threshold may apply where the order merely preserves the position pending trial.

The claimants sought to set aside a 2018 English default judgment for US$14,986,791 on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. The defendant had commenced proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking recognition and enforcement of that judgment.

The New York proceedings were stayed by agreement pending determination of the claimants’ application for an anti-enforcement injunction. The central question was whether enforcement should be restrained pending determination of the English claim to set aside the default judgment.

1. Power and principles. The court had power to grant an anti-enforcement injunction under section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The jurisdiction is in personam and may restrain enforcement proceedings in another country. It is not limited to cases involving actual or alleged fraud. Such relief remains rare because delay and comity commonly weigh against it.
2. Applicable interim test. Where relief is sought on the non-contractual ground that enforcement would be vexatious and oppressive, the applicant will generally need to show a high probability of succeeding at trial. That test reflects the fact that an interim anti-suit or anti-enforcement injunction may determine in practice where the dispute is litigated. Where the order merely holds the ring pending trial and is not practically determinative, an American Cyanamid approach may be appropriate.
3. Application. The claimants had an apparently strong case that the default judgment was fraudulent. There was a compelling case that enforcement before determination of that claim would be vexatious and oppressive. The risk that sums paid would be irrecoverable outweighed the defendant’s more limited prejudice from delay, particularly as interest would accrue and compensation might be available under the cross-undertaking in damages.
4. Comity and order. Comity did not prevent relief. The injunction protected the integrity of the English court’s own processes, and the New York court had agreed to abide by the English decision on the application. The anti-enforcement injunction was therefore granted pending final determination of the fraud claim or further order.