Jake (a child), Re

A local authority may invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to authorise a child’s deprivation of liberty only where the conditions in section 100(4) of the Children Act 1989 are satisfied. It must show reasonable cause to believe that, without the order, the child is likely to suffer significant harm.

Where a young offender is released on licence, the court must take account of the legal consequences of breaching the licence, including recall to custody. Those consequences may provide a sufficient safeguard against absconding or other harmful conduct. The court should also recognise the Youth Justice Service’s primary responsibility for rehabilitating young offenders and should not use its parens patriae jurisdiction to micro-manage specialist youth-offending arrangements.

The local authority applied under section 100(3) and (4) of the Children Act 1989 for permission to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and continue an order authorising the deprivation of Jake’s liberty. Jake, aged sixteen, had been convicted of serious sexual offences and released from custody on licence.

The local authority sought a further six-week order to support a phased reduction in supervision and manage risks of absconding and further harm. The Guardian opposed continuation, relying on the restrictions and sanctions arising under the licence and on the Youth Justice Service’s responsibilities. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for exercising the inherent jurisdiction was met.

1. Application refused. The existing deprivation of liberty order was not extended.
2. Section 100(4)(a) of the Children Act 1989 was satisfied because no order of a kind within section 100(5) could achieve the local authority’s immediate aims. Section 100(4)(b), however, was not satisfied. The local authority had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Jake was likely to suffer significant harm without a deprivation of liberty order.
3. The local authority’s assessment that there was no effective alternative was mistaken. A deprivation of liberty order is permissive and carries no sanction for breach beyond permitting limited physical force to secure compliance. A breach of licence conditions, by contrast, could result in revocation of the licence and recall to custody until the end of the licence period. That was a significantly more severe consequence and provided Jake with a strong incentive not to abscond or breach the licence.
4. The licence conditions also permitted a phased reduction in restrictions. Conditions concerning offending behaviour, education, housing and support networks enabled the Youth Justice Service to impose requirements directed to Jake’s rehabilitation. The absence of evidence from Jake’s supervising officer made assessment of the competing plans more difficult, but did not establish that the Youth Justice Service would fail to provide appropriate support.
5. The Youth Justice Service was the primary state body responsible for rehabilitating a young offender released on licence. The local authority’s social work team had only a secondary responsibility in that respect. The High Court should not use its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to micro-manage the specialist decisions of the Youth Justice Service. The judge expressly left unresolved the wider questions concerning the interaction between the criminal sentencing and licensing regimes and the inherent jurisdiction.

The court refused to extend the order, while indicating that a short extension could be considered if the local authority sought permission to appeal.