W v M

An appeal court ordinarily reviews the lower court’s decision and does not rehear the case. Fresh evidence is admitted only where the established criteria are met, including reasonable diligence, likely material influence on the result and apparent credibility.

On a de novo welfare hearing, the judge must decide the child’s welfare on the evidence then available and is not bound by earlier welfare findings. Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason, and an appeal may succeed only if the decision was wrong or unjust through procedural irregularity.

A Children Act 1989 section 91(14) order is a procedural permission safeguard, not a bar to access to the court, but may be justified where further litigation would place the child at risk of harm.

The father sought permission to appeal from HHJ Vincent’s decision that the parties’ 12-year-old daughter, G, should continue living with her mother and attending school in V. He also sought to adduce evidence concerning alleged deterioration in G’s presentation and schooling, and information about her older brother.

The proposed appeal alleged failures to assess alternative schooling and contact arrangements, to consider earlier judicial findings and professional evidence, and to evaluate evidence concerning schooling in V. The mother sought costs. The court also considered whether to make a Children Act 1989 section 91(14) order and whether HHJ Vincent’s judgment should be published in anonymised form.

1. Fresh evidence. The application to adduce new evidence was refused. The court applied the principles in Ladd v Marshall, requiring reasonable diligence, evidence likely to have an important influence on the result, and apparent credibility. The proposed evidence was highly contested, largely a continuation of matters already before HHJ Vincent, and had not been fairly tested.
2. Permission and appeal. Permission was refused under Family Procedure Rules 30.3(7). None of the six grounds had a real prospect of success or disclosed another compelling reason. Under rule 30.12, an appeal could succeed only if the decision was wrong or unjust because of procedural irregularity.
3. Welfare decision. HHJ Vincent had carefully evaluated G’s emotional and educational needs, the parents’ respective capacities, the effects of parental conflict and the realistic options available. A detailed comparison of English schools was unnecessary because the father’s proposals depended on a move to his care, which was itself found unrealistic and contrary to G’s welfare. The judge was entitled to distinguish the circumstances of the earlier appeal and to assess the evidence independently.
4. Because the final hearing before HHJ Vincent was de novo, she was not bound by earlier welfare findings. Her task was to decide G’s welfare under section 1 of the Children Act 1989 on the evidence before her.
5. Orders and costs. The appeal was dismissed and certified as totally without merit. A section 91(14) order was made until G reached 16, requiring permission before further applications. The father’s pursuit of the appeal constituted unreasonable litigation conduct, and the mother’s costs were summarily assessed at £22,300.80, applying the principles in Re E (Children: Costs).
6. Publication. HHJ Vincent’s judgment was authorised for publication with anonymisation. The public interest in transparency outweighed the competing privacy interests because appropriate anonymisation could protect the children’s identities.

• High Court (Family Division) — Permission to appeal from HHJ Vincent’s February 2025 judgment was refused. The appeal was dismissed and certified as totally without merit.
• Earlier proceedings — The judgment describes a prior decision of HHJ Tolson KC and earlier decisions by DJ Harrison, but gives no citations for them.