Gillian McGivern v MBR Acres Limited and Others

On a standard-basis costs assessment, the court must allow costs that are proportionate to the matters in issue and reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount. The assessment requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including conduct, value, importance, complexity, skill, responsibility, time spent and location of work. High hourly rates require specific justification, particularly where travel and attendance by senior fee earners are claimed. Comparisons with the opposing party’s costs may assist in assessing overall proportionality, but they do not remove the need to scrutinise individual rates and work items.

The judgment concerned the consequential assessment of costs following the dismissal of an appeal against an order of Costs Judge Whalan dated 20 November 2024 and an application for a costs capping order.

The respondents claimed £43,312.50 excluding VAT for the appeal and costs-capping application. The appellant accepted that costs were payable but argued that they should be nominal or limited to £15,000 plus VAT. The central issues were the reasonableness and proportionality of the respondents’ hourly rates, travel and attendance costs, counsel’s fees, specific work items and total costs.

1. Costs assessed. The respondents’ costs were assessed at £34,000, with VAT not claimed. The appeal and the costs-capping application had previously been dismissed.
2. Under Civil Procedure Rules 44.4, standard-basis costs must be proportionate to the matters in issue and reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the parties’ conduct, the amount or value involved, the importance and complexity of the case, the skill and responsibility required, the time spent and the place where work was done.
3. The respondents had not provided sufficient justification for Grade A rates materially exceeding the Manchester guideline rate of £288 per hour, especially where a significant amount of work was charged at the highest rate. The availability of a local office or a lower-grade fee earner was relevant to the scrutiny of attendance and travel costs.
4. The absence of a detailed counsel’s fee note did not prevent summary assessment. The comparable instruction of leading counsel by both parties, and broadly comparable fees, supported the conclusion that the respondents’ counsel’s fees were not facially disproportionate.
5. Several work items appeared excessive or potentially duplicative, including consideration of the appeal notice and grounds, review of counsel’s skeleton argument and preparation of the N260. Advice on strategic issues was not work between the parties for the purpose of inter partes costs.
6. The case’s importance and complexity justified significant costs. The appellant’s own costs and her earlier application for a £30,000 costs cap provided relevant benchmarks. After allowing for those factors but reducing high hourly rates and excessive time claims, £34,000 was the just and proportionate figure.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): Appeal against the order of Costs Judge Whalan dated 20 November 2024 and application for a costs capping order dismissed following judgment handed down on 4 August 2025. In this consequential judgment, the respondents’ costs were assessed at £34,000.