AMV v TDX

An interim injunction may restrain publication of private and confidential information where the claimant is likely to establish that the information is private, confidential, imparted on that basis, and not subject to a public interest in disclosure. Under section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, compelling reasons may justify a hearing without notice and in private where advance publicity would defeat the application. Anonymisation and privacy restrictions must be necessary, and less restrictive measures must be considered. The balance of convenience may favour relief where threatened disclosure would cause serious and disproportionate harm, notwithstanding the defendant’s rights under Articles 8 and 10.

The claimant applied without notice for an interim injunction restraining the defendant from publishing specified private and confidential information. The hearing was held in private. The claimant also sought anonymisation and ancillary protective orders.

The central issues were whether the statutory conditions for proceeding without notice and in private were met, whether publication was likely to be restrained under section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, whether anonymisation was necessary, and where the balance of convenience lay pending a return hearing.

1. The applications for an interim injunction, a private hearing, anonymisation and ancillary orders were granted. The orders remained subject to review on the return date.
2. For the purposes of section 12(2)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, there were compelling reasons to proceed without notice and in private. Publicity would defeat the object of the application, and the evidence suggested that advance warning might lead to disclosure of the confidential information.
3. Derogations from open justice are exceptional. The circumstances were sufficiently exceptional because disclosure could seriously damage the claimant and the claimant’s immediate family. Anonymisation was also necessary because either a private hearing without anonymisation, or anonymisation without a private hearing, might permit identification.
4. The evidence showed that the information was confidential, had been imparted expressly on the basis that it would remain private, and was information which the defendant ought reasonably to have known or appreciated was private and confidential. The claimant therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy and there was no public interest in disclosure. The claimant was likely to establish that publication should not be allowed under section 12(3).
5. The court could not finally determine at the interim stage whether the alleged threats were genuine or amounted to blackmail. Nevertheless, the defendant appeared to know that the information was confidential and had no obvious right to disclose it. If the threats were real, the resulting harm to the claimant and family would be disproportionate to a short-term restriction on disclosure. The balance of convenience therefore favoured the claimant, notwithstanding the defendant’s rights under Articles 8 and 10.