British Camelids Limited v Brooke Hospital for Animals & Ors

In construing a charitable gift in a will, the court must identify the testator’s objective intention from the words used, the will as a whole, the surrounding circumstances known at execution and common sense.

A gift to a named unincorporated charity is ordinarily a gift for the charity’s purposes, rather than a gift conditional on the continued existence of that particular organisation. Detailed identifying information does not displace that construction unless the will shows that the named institution was essential as the vehicle for applying the gift. The gift may therefore remain effective where a successor organisation continues the relevant charitable purposes, even under a different legal form or name.

The claimant, as personal representative of Candia Midworth, sought directions under a Part 8 claim concerning the construction of residue gifts in Mrs Midworth’s will.

The will made gifts to British Camelids Limited, Brooke Hospital for Animals, the Zoo Check Project of the Born Free Foundation, the Libearty Campaign of the World Society for the Protection of Animals, Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary and the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection. Several named unincorporated charities had ceased to exist after transferring their activities, assets or liabilities to successor organisations.

The central questions were whether continued existence in the legal form named in the will was a condition of the gifts, whether the first to third defendants were successors entitled to benefit, and whether the gift to Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary failed or could be applied to continuing charitable purposes.

1. The court determined the construction issues in favour of preserving the charitable gifts. Consequential matters, including restrictions on the second and third defendants’ shares and the beneficiaries of a scheme for the Burstow share, were reserved for further submissions.

2. The proper approach was to ascertain the testator’s objective intention by considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, the will as a whole, its overall purpose, facts known or assumed at execution under the armchair principle, and common sense. The principles were conveniently summarised in Dryden v Young [2024] WTLR 843.

3. Gifts to the claimant and the fourth defendant were gifts to the identified corporate entities because both remained incorporated in the same legal form. For an unincorporated charity, however, the prima facie construction was a gift for its charitable purposes. The phrase referring to beneficiaries that existed at death had to be construed consistently with that characterisation.

4. The Brooke Hospital for Animals’ charitable purposes were international and were not confined to its former address or legal structure. The first defendant continued those purposes and therefore took the gift.

5. The gifts referring to the Zoo Check Project and the Libearty Campaign were gifts for the charitable purposes of those projects. The second and third defendants continued the relevant purposes, despite the projects no longer having separate identities within their organisational structures. They therefore took the respective gifts for those purposes.

6. The gift to Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary did not fail. Its charitable purposes remained capable of implementation and were carried on by at least the first, second and third defendants. The intended share should be distributed by scheme among appropriate parties.