Klotho Brands Limited v Kevin Gerald Stanford

A court order, including an injunction, must be obeyed unless and until it is overturned on appeal or set aside by a proper application. Allegations that the order was obtained by fraud do not justify disregarding it in later enforcement or contempt proceedings.

A court may proceed with a contempt application in the respondent’s absence where the respondent has been properly served, had adequate notice and opportunity to participate, has given no good reason for non-attendance, has clearly waived attendance, and an adjournment is unlikely to secure participation. The court must weigh prejudice and apply the overriding objective.

Changing an individual’s name does not create a new legal person or invalidate service. CPR rule 23.8 gives the court, rather than a party, discretion to determine an application on paper.

The claimant sought committal proceedings against the defendant for alleged breaches of a High Court order dated 5 April 2022. The order declared that the defendant had no right to certain shares and imposed a permanent injunction. The defendant sought a stay or adjournment, alleging defective service, non-joinder, fraud in obtaining the 2022 order, and procedural breaches.

A separate application was made by the DS Family Trust through Lukas Stanford, who claimed to be its trustee. The court considered whether he had standing, whether the trust should have been joined to the earlier proceedings, and whether either application justified staying the contempt proceedings. The central issues were whether the court could proceed in the defendant’s absence and whether the existing order could be challenged indirectly in enforcement proceedings.

1. The defendant’s application was dismissed. CPR rule 23.8 is facultative. It gives the court discretion to determine suitable applications on paper; it does not confer a right on a party to insist on paper determination. The proposed reliance on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights was misplaced. The mode of determining the application did not itself determine civil rights.
2. Changing the defendant’s name did not make him a different person or invalidate service. The order remained binding on him. The use of the same name by a private unlimited company did not alter that conclusion, because the order was plainly directed to the individual defendant.
3. The 2022 order had not been appealed or set aside. The earlier fraud allegations had been considered and rejected in proceedings properly brought under Part 8. The defendant could not go behind the order in the present proceedings. More generally, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, including an injunction, must be obeyed unless and until overturned on appeal or set aside by proper application. The court applied the principles in Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 and Majera v The Home Secretary [2022] AC 461.
4. The trust’s application was also dismissed. The evidence did not establish that Lukas Stanford had been validly appointed trustee under the trust deed. Further, the trust was not a necessary party. CPR rule 19.2(2) was the relevant provision, not rule 19.2(3), and CPR rule 3.10 meant that non-compliance with a procedural rule would not automatically invalidate the proceedings. The claim concerned the defendant’s interest, not the trust’s shareholding, so the trust was not prejudiced. The court relied on Dollfus Mieg v Bank of England [1951] Ch 33.
5. The court proceeded with the contempt hearing in the defendant’s absence. Applying the considerations identified in Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) and Madison Pacific v Groza [2024] EWHC 2307 (Comm), the court found proper service, sufficient notice, no good reason for absence, clear waiver of attendance, no realistic prospect that an adjournment would secure attendance, limited prejudice to the defendant, and substantial prejudice to the claimant from delay. Proceeding was unusual but not exceptional and was consistent with the overriding objective.

The judgment describes an earlier High Court order dated 5 April 2022. That order had not been appealed or set aside. The present judgment determined subsequent applications to stay or adjourn enforcement and contempt proceedings.