Maciej Ratajczak v Regional Court in Poznan, Poland

Permission to appeal in extradition proceedings requires a ground that is reasonably arguable. An Article 8 challenge faces a high threshold. The public interest in extradition will generally outweigh interference with private or family life unless the consequences are exceptionally severe.

Culpable delay does not necessarily make extradition disproportionate, particularly where the person deliberately remained beyond the requesting state’s reach and was not lulled into security by the delay. Time spent in custody during extradition proceedings does not extinguish an outstanding conviction or sentence. The sentencing calculation remains for the requesting judicial authority.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Poland under a conviction warrant concerning two activated custodial sentences imposed in 2007.

The proposed appeal relied on section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant relied principally on the passage of approximately 15 to 16 years before the arrest warrant was issued, his time on remand in the extradition proceedings, and the age of the convictions.

The central issue was whether the proposed Article 8 ground was reasonably arguable.

1. Permission test. Under Rule 50.17(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules, permission required a ground that was reasonably arguable.
2. Article 8 threshold. The Supreme Court’s guidance in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23 and the statement in H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25; [2012] 1 AC 338 established a high threshold. Extradition would be disproportionate on private-life grounds only in highly unusual circumstances, and the public interest in extradition would ordinarily prevail unless the interference with family life was exceptionally severe.
3. Application of the balancing exercise. The District Judge had properly weighed the public interest in extradition, the outstanding sentences totalling two years and four months, the applicant’s fugitive status, his lack of lawful immigration status, his minimal private and family life in the United Kingdom, the nature of the offending and the culpable delay. His deliberate decision to place himself beyond the Polish authorities’ reach strongly weakened an Article 8 case based on delay.
4. Remand time and outstanding sentences. The applicant was sought in respect of all the offences and sentences. Whether time spent on remand would discharge some or all of a sentence was a matter for the Polish judicial authority. It did not extinguish the earlier conviction or sentence or alter the basis on which extradition was sought.
5. No reasonably arguable basis existed to contend that the District Judge had misapplied legal principles, made an unreasonable finding of fact, or reached an irrational or perverse conclusion. Permission to appeal was refused.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Sheldon J refused permission to appeal on the papers on 5 December 2024. Foster J refused an application to adduce fresh evidence on 13 March 2025 and stayed the permission application pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): Mr Justice Sweeting, on renewal, refused permission to appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order.