Piotr Marzec v Warsaw Regional Court, Poland

For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate absence requires an unequivocal waiver of the right to attend the relevant criminal proceedings. Fugitivity alone is insufficient. The court must assess whether the requested person knowingly and voluntarily placed themselves beyond the reach of the proceedings, with sufficient awareness of the accusation, the continuing process and the likely consequences.

Waiver may extend to later hearings determining the final sentence where the person knew that sentence remained unresolved, deliberately avoided official notifications and understood that proceedings would continue in their absence. Actual knowledge of the precise hearing date or place is not invariably required.

The appellant appealed against an order made by District Judge Pilling at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 28 June 2024 ordering his extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a sentence imposed for seven offences.

Ground 1 concerned whether section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 was satisfied in relation to a Polish decision dated 23 September 2015 which reduced the cumulative sentence for Offences 1–3. Ground 2 alleged that, if those offences were excluded, extradition for Offences 4–7 would be disproportionate under Article 8 of the ECHR.

The central issue was whether the appellant had unequivocally waived his right to participate in the September 2015 sentencing decision or any appeal from it.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The High Court accepted that section 20 must be interpreted consistently with Article 6 of the ECHR and the relevant European instruments. The statutory phrase deliberate absence is synonymous with an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present at trial.
2. Fugitivity does not automatically establish waiver. The court must consider the facts, including whether the person knew of the criminal proceedings and accusation, deliberately placed themselves beyond the authorities’ reach, and understood that hearings could proceed in their absence. A waiver must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent, although precise knowledge of the hearing date and place is not invariably necessary.
3. The District Judge had found that the appellant knew that his sentence remained to be finally determined, left Poland to avoid imprisonment, deliberately avoided receiving court correspondence, and understood that hearings would proceed without him. Those findings established a general waiver extending to the final determination of sentence for all seven offences.
4. Although the District Judge had not separately analysed the September 2015 decision under section 20, the High Court held that the reasoning applied equally to it. The fact that the decision might have been an additional stage rather than part of the earlier cumulative-sentence process did not alter the appellant’s deliberate decision not to participate in the continuing sentencing process.
5. The alternative argument under section 20(5) did not need to be resolved. The court identified uncertainty about the nature of the available appeal and distinguished the circumstances from Szatkowski, where the requested person had actually received notice and knowingly chosen not to appeal.
6. Ground 2 dismissed. It was advanced only on the assumption that Ground 1 succeeded. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the order of District Judge Pilling at Westminster Magistrates’ Court dated 28 June 2024; appeal dismissed.