H (A Child) (Appeal: Child Maintenance), Re

An application to extend child maintenance beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday may be made informally within existing proceedings. It is sufficient if the other party has timely notice of the application, its basis and the relevant evidence.

Under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court may make or extend an order after the child turns eighteen where the application was made before that birthday and the child is, or will be, receiving education or training. The order may continue for the period reasonably supported by the evidence, including until the likely end of tertiary education.

This was an appeal from an order made by HHJ Oliver in the Central Family Court on 26 April 2024. The order extended an existing child maintenance order until 31 August 2028, when the child was expected to complete tertiary education.

The appellant challenged the order on two permitted grounds: that he had not been given notice of an application to extend maintenance, and that the duration arguably exceeded the child’s tertiary education. The application had been raised in the respondent’s skeleton argument in existing enforcement proceedings before the child’s eighteenth birthday.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order extending child maintenance until 31 August 2028 remained in force and the stay on specified paragraphs of that order was lifted.
2. The respondent’s application to extend the duration of maintenance had been made in her skeleton argument dated 23 January 2024. The issue was also raised orally at the hearing on 24 January, when the appellant was present and heard the respondent’s reasons and evidence. He therefore had notice of the application before the child’s eighteenth birthday.
3. An informal application made within existing proceedings was sufficient to engage the court’s powers under section 29 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The court applied the reasoning in Mutch v Mutch [2016] EWCA Civ 370 and Tattersall v Tattersall [2018] EWCA Civ 1978, which recognised that formal process is not invariably required where the substance of the application and the opposing party’s notice are clear.
4. The court had power to make the order after the child’s eighteenth birthday because the application had been made beforehand. Applying UD V DN (Schedule 1 Children Act 1989: Capital Provision) [2021] EWCA Civ 1947, the relevant date for jurisdiction was the date of application, not the date of determination.
5. The evidence established that the child was, and would continue to be, receiving education at a tertiary institution until 31 August 2028. The statutory condition in section 29(3)(a) was therefore satisfied, and the duration of the order was justified.
6. The appellant did not pursue the second permitted ground at the hearing. In any event, the evidence before HHJ Oliver provided a sufficient basis for the duration ordered.

• High Court (Family Division): Appeal from the Central Family Court dismissed. The order of HHJ Oliver dated 26 April 2024 remained in force.