LL & Anor, R (on the application of) v Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council

A council tax reduction scheme is unlawful if it is adopted by a body lacking statutory authority. The statutory decision-maker must also be shown objectively to have taken the adoption decision. A scheme is irrational where its terms inevitably double count income and produce obviously unfair outcomes for people with the same actual resources. A discretionary power to mitigate hardship will not generally cure a systemic defect affecting a significant and foreseeable group, particularly where access to that discretion lacks a statutory appeal. The public sector equality duty requires the decision-maker to understand the scheme’s actual consequences. Failure to identify a substantial adverse impact on disabled people may breach that duty. The scheme also constituted discrimination arising from disability and discrimination under section 19A of the Equality Act 2010.

The claimants, Trafford residents liable for council tax, challenged the defendant council’s 2025–2026 working-age Council Tax Reduction Scheme. They argued that the scheme had not been adopted by the full council, as required by the Local Government Finance Act 1992, and that its income calculation double counted income which had already reduced Universal Credit.

The defendant argued that the Executive Committee had lawfully prepared and approved the scheme, that the full council adopted it as part of the budget process, and that any defect lay only in the software. It also relied on discretionary council tax relief. The issues were whether the scheme had been lawfully adopted and whether its operation was irrational, breached the public sector equality duty, or constituted unlawful discrimination.

1. Adoption. Section 67 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 required the function of making or revising a council tax reduction scheme to be discharged only by the authority. The Executive Committee therefore lacked power to adopt the scheme. Although the full council had received material at earlier stages, the objective record did not show that it had been asked to approve, or had approved, the scheme. Every outward manifestation indicated that approval had already been given by the Executive Committee. The scheme was therefore unlawfully adopted (paras [45]–[52]).
2. Irrationality. The double-counting defect was in the scheme itself, not merely in the software. On a paper calculation, income which reduced Universal Credit was still included in deemed income under the scheme. This produced obviously unfair and irrational results for people with the same actual income whose circumstances could not rationally be distinguished. A discretionary relief policy did not cure the defect. The affected group was significant and foreseeable, relief normally required an application, awards were generally short term, and there was no right of appeal equivalent to the statutory appeal route (paras [77]–[83], [94]–[96]).
3. Equality duties and discrimination. The relevant decision-maker had not considered the scheme or the equality impact assessment. The assessment was also substantively inadequate because it failed to identify the double-counting defect and its disproportionate effect on disabled people. The scheme discriminated against LL under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, because she was treated unfavourably because of income arising from disability. AU, although not disabled, suffered substantially the same disadvantage and was protected by section 19A. The court therefore did not need to decide the reasonable-adjustment or Convention claims (paras [84]–[91]).
4. Order. Permission was granted on both grounds. The judicial review succeeded on both grounds. The scheme was quashed and declaratory relief was granted (para [97]).